Germany’s War, Chapter 4: The Allied Conspiracy to Instigate & Prolong WWII

Germany’s War by John Wear. Chapter 4:

President Franklin D. Roosevelt revealed his antagonism toward Germany when he wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson on Aug. 26, 1944: “Too many people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place—that only a few Nazi leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.”1

President Roosevelt in this communication ignores the existence of a German opposition to National Socialism which frequently manifested itself during its rule and which culminated in the unsuccessful conspiracy to assassinate Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944. More importantly, Roosevelt tried to place the entire blame for starting World War II on the German people as a whole. As we have seen, Germany and its people were not primarily responsible for starting World War II. In this chapter we will show that, in fact, it was President Roosevelt and the other Allied leaders who were engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.

FDR Conspires to Allow ‘Surprise’ Attack at Pearl Harbor

By the closing months of 1941, the United States was intercepting and breaking within a matter of hours almost every code produced by Japan.2 The Army Signal Corps had broken the top Japanese diplomatic code known as PURPLE in August 1940. The United States was thus able to decipher and read all diplomatic messages sent between Tokyo and Japanese officials all over the world. Copies of these and other intercepted messages were circulated to all key administration officials in Washington, D.C. These messages, known as MAGIC, revealed much important information to the recipients.

The United States sent duplicate code machines to London, Singapore, and the Philippine Islands to keep the British and our Far East forces informed. Hawaii never received a duplicate code machine. Therefore, our government in Washington, D.C. had a far greater than normal responsibility to make certain that Hawaii was properly informed and alerted.3 However, the two United States commanders at Pearl Harbor, Rear Adm. Husband Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter Short, were never informed of the intercepted Japanese messages. The Roosevelt administration did not disclose these intercepted Japanese messages to Kimmel and Short because it wanted the Japanese to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

In the last week of November 1941, Roosevelt knew that an attack by the Japanese in the Pacific was imminent. Roosevelt warned William Bullitt against traveling across the Pacific, “I am expecting the Japs to attack any time now, probably within the next three or four days.”4 Roosevelt and his administration knew this based on the intercepted Japanese messages. This information should have been given to the commanders at Pearl Harbor to enable them to prepare for and thwart the Japanese attack.

The war was only 10 days old before some Congressmen questioned why America’s military leaders at Pearl Harbor had been unprepared for the Japanese attack. Fearing that a congressional investigation would harm both his political future and the war effort, Roosevelt appointed a five-man board of inquiry headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court. In order to maintain military secrecy, the Roberts Commission did not examine or discuss any of the Japanese naval intercepts. The Roberts Commission’s report concluded that the Pearl Harbor attack was successful due to failures and errors of judgment by Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short. They were both charged with dereliction of duty. President Roosevelt approved the Roberts Commission’s report on Jan. 24, 1942.5

A number of investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack followed the Roberts Commission report. Most of these investigations have been attempts to suppress, mislead, or confuse those who seek the truth. Facts and files have been withheld so as to reveal only those items of information which benefit the Roosevelt administration.6

Investigations conducted by the Army and Navy boards did eventually exonerate Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short from derelictions of duty and failures to act which were “the effective causes” of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In its report released on Aug. 29, 1945, the Navy Court of Inquiry said that Adm. Harold Stark had “failed to display the sound judgment expected of him” in not transmitting to Adm. Kimmel in 1941 important information. This important information included warning Kimmel “that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.”7

One commentator has noted that those who maintained secrecy, failed to remember, or testified on behalf of the administration in the Pearl Harbor investigations rose very quickly to high places. These people include Gen. George Marshall, who was made a permanent five-star general, Col. Walter Bedell Smith, who became a three-star general, Alben Barkley, who became Vice-President under Harry Truman, Sen. Scott Lucas, who became the Senate majority leader, and John W. Murphy and Samuel H. Kaufman, who were both appointed to lifetime Federal judgeships. On the other hand, virtually no one who testified in the various hearings as to the facts that were damaging to the Roosevelt administration and their superiors was ever promoted or rewarded.8

None of the Pearl Harbor investigations were able to prove definitively that the Roosevelt administration knew beforehand of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This is because key evidence began to be concealed as early as Dec. 11, 1941. On this date Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes, the Navy’s Director of Communications, consigned the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese military and diplomatic intercepts and the relevant directives to Navy vaults. In August 1945, the Navy blocked public access to the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts by classifying the documents TOP SECRET. When the congressional investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack began on Nov. 15, 1945, only diplomatic messages were released. None of the details of the interception, decoding, or dissemination of the pre-Pearl Harbor naval messages were introduced into evidence.9

The Freedom of Information Act has since been used by Robert Stinnett to release information not available in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. Stinnett, a veteran of the Pacific War, conducted 17 years of research involving more than 200,000 documents and interviews. Stinnett concludes that: 1) the United States provoked Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor; 2) U.S. intelligence knew that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was coming; and 3) Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were deprived of this intelligence.10

Stinnett states: “Seven Japanese naval broadcasts intercepted between November 28 and December 6 [1941] confirmed that Japan intended to start the war and that it would begin at Pearl Harbor. The evidence that poured into American intelligence stations is overpowering. All the broadcasts have one common denominator: none ever reached Admiral Kimmel.”11

Adm. Robert A. Theobald, who was in the port of Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, conducted extensive research for many years into the Pearl Harbor attack. Theobald concludes that President Roosevelt forced Japan to war by unrelenting diplomatic-economic pressure. Also, Theobald concludes that Roosevelt enticed Japan to initiate hostilities with its surprise attack of the Pacific fleet in Hawaiian waters. By withholding information from Adm. Kimmel that would have caused Kimmel to render the attack impossible, Theobald states that President Roosevelt brought war to the United States on Dec. 7, 1941. There would have been no Pearl Harbor attack if MAGIC had been made available to the Hawaiian commanders.12

Adm. Theobald lists the following facts to show that the Pearl Harbor attack was in accord with President Roosevelt’s plans:

1. President Roosevelt and his military and naval advisors were well aware that Japan invariably started her wars with a surprise attack synchronized closely with her delivery of the Declaration of War;

2. In October, 1940, the President stated that, if war broke out in the Pacific, Japan would commit the overt act which would bring the United States into war;

3. The Pacific Fleet, against contrary naval advice, was retained in Hawaii by order of the President for the alleged reason that the Fleet, so located, would exert a restrictive effect upon Japanese aggression in the Far East;

4. The Fleet in Hawaii was neither powerful enough nor in the necessary strategic position to influence Japan’s diplomatic decisions, which could only be accomplished by the stationing of an adequate naval force in Far Eastern waters;

5. Before the Fleet could operate at any distance from Pearl Harbor, its train (tankers, supply and repair vessels) would have had to be tremendously increased in strength—facts that would not escape the notice of the experienced Japanese spies in Hawaii;

6. President Roosevelt gave unmistakable evidence, in March, 1941, that he was not greatly concerned with the Pacific Fleet’s effects upon Japanese diplomatic decisions, when he authorized the weakening of that Fleet, already inferior to that of Japan, by the detachment of three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four light cruisers, and eighteen destroyers for duty in the Atlantic—a movement which would immediately be detected by Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone;

7. The successful crippling of the Pacific Fleet was the only surprise operation which promised the Japanese Navy sufficiently large results to justify the risk of heavy losses from land-based air attacks if the surprised failed;

8. Such an operation against the Fleet in Hawaii was attended with far greater chances of success, especially from the surprise standpoint, and far less risk of heavy losses than a similar attack against the Fleet based in U.S. West Coast ports;

9. The retention of the Fleet in Hawaii, especially after its reduction in strength in March, 1941, could serve only one possible purpose, an invitation to a surprise Japanese attack;

10. The denial to the Hawaiian Commanders of all knowledge of Magic was vital to the plan for enticing Japan to deliver a surprise attack upon the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, because, as late as Saturday, December 6, Admiral Kimmel could have caused the attack to be cancelled by taking his Fleet to sea and disappearing beyond land-based human ken.13

Adm. Theobald’s conclusions are reinforced by Adm. William F. Halsey, who was one of three senior commanders of the Pacific Fleet serving under Adm. Kimmel. Adm. Halsey states: “. . . I did not know then of any of the pertinent ‘Magic Messages.’ All our intelligence pointed to an attack by Japan against the Philippines or the southern areas in Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. While Pearl Harbor was considered and not ruled out, the mass of evidence made available to us pointed in another direction. Had we known of Japan’s minute and continued interest in the exact location and movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor, as indicated in the ‘Magic Messages,’ it is only logical that we would have concentrated our thought on meeting the practical certainty of an attack on Pearl Harbor.”14

Adm. Kimmel was dumbfounded that the MAGIC messages were never disclosed to him. Kimmel states that if he had all of the important information then available to the Navy Department, he would have gone to sea with his fleet and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.15 Adm. Kimmel concludes in regard to the Pearl Harbor attacks:

Again and again in my mind I have reviewed the events that preceded the Japanese attack, seeking to determine if I was unjustified in drawing from the orders, directives and information that were forwarded to me the conclusions that I did. The fact that I then thought and now think my conclusions were sound when based upon the information I received, has sustained me during the years that have passed since the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor.

When the information available in Washington was disclosed to me I was appalled. Nothing in my experience of nearly forty-two years of service in the Navy had prepared me for the actions of the highest officials in our government which denied this vital information to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

If those in authority wished to engage in power politics, the least that they should have done was to advise their naval and military commanders what they were endeavoring to accomplish. To utilize the Pacific Fleet and the Army forces at Pearl Harbor as a lure for a Japanese attack without advising the commander-in-chief of the fleet and the commander of the Army base at Hawaii is something I am wholly unable to comprehend.16

Adm. James O. Richardson agrees with Kimmel’s assessment. Rich- ardson wrote after the war:

I consider that, after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt. . . . I consider “Betty” Stark, in failing to ensure that Kimmel was furnished with all the information available from the breaking Japanese dispatches, to have been to a marked degree professionally negligent in carrying out his duties as Chief of Naval Operations.

This offense was compounded, since in writing he had assured the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet twice (both myself and Kimmel) that the Commander-in-Chief was “being kept advised on all matters within his own [Stark’s] knowledge” and “you may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.”17

The U.S. government and military possessed solid intelligence before Dec. 7, 1941, concerning Japanese plans to attack the United States. According to the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what . . . Japanese potential moves . . . were scheduled . . . against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy’s intentions. . . . This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity of resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.18

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was no surprise to the Roosevelt administration. Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were denied the vital information of a planned Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor because Roosevelt wanted an excuse to get the United States into the war. Roosevelt made Kimmel and Short the scapegoats for the Pearl Harbor tragedy. This is consistent with Franklin Roosevelt’s complex and devious nature. Roosevelt admitted to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau six months after Pearl Harbor: “You know I am a juggler, and I never let my right hand know what my left hand does . . . and furthermore I am willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war.”19

FDR Conspires to Force the U.S. to Enter World War II

Numerous historians and political leaders conclude that Roosevelt conspired to force the United States into war. Historian Harry Elmer Barnes summarizes President Roosevelt’s efforts to involve the United States in World War II:

Roosevelt “lied the United States into war.” He went as far as he dared in illegal efforts, such as convoying vessels carrying munitions, to provoke Germany and Italy to make war on the United States. Failing in this, he turned to a successful attempt to enter the War through the back door of Japan. He rejected repeated and sincere Japanese proposals that even Hull admitted protected all the vital interests of the United States in the Far East, by his economic strangulation in the summer of 1941 forced the Japanese into an attack on Pearl Harbor, took steps to prevent the Pearl Harbor commanders, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, from having their own decoding facilities to detect a Japanese attack, kept Short and Kimmel from receiving the decoded Japanese intercepts that Washington picked up and indicated that war might come at any moment, and ordered General Marshall and Admiral Stark not to send any warning to Short and Kimmel before noon on December 7th, when Roosevelt knew that any warning sent would be too late to avert the Japanese attack at 1:00 P.M., Washington time.20

William Henry Chamberlain also concludes that Roosevelt guided America into the war. Chamberlain writes: “The war with Germany was also very largely the result of the initiative of the Roosevelt Administration. The destroyer deal, the lend-lease bill, the freezing of Axis assets, the injection of the American Navy, with much secrecy and doubletalk, into the Battle of the Atlantic: these and many similar actions were obvious departures from neutrality, even though a Neutrality Act, which the President had sworn to uphold, was still on the statute books.”21

Chamberlain goes on to state that America’s entry into World War II was based on illusions:

America’s Second Crusade was a product of illusions which are already bankrupt. It was an illusion that that the United States was at any time in danger of invasion by Nazi Germany. It was an illusion that Hitler was bent on the destruction of the British Empire. It was an illusion that China was capable of becoming a strong, friendly, western-oriented power in the Far East. It was an illusion that a powerful Soviet Union in a weakened and impoverished Eurasia would be a force for peace, conciliation, stability, and international co-operation. It was an illusion that the evils and dangers associated with totalitarianism could be eliminated by giving unconditional support to one form of totalitarianism against another. It was an illusion that a combination of appeasement and personal charm could melt away designs of conquest and domination which were deeply rooted in Russian history and Communist philosophy.22

Historian Klaus Fischer writes that Roosevelt implemented numerous actions in 1941 that prepared the United States to enter World War II:

Roosevelt’s actions against both Germany and Japan were positively provocative, including the previously mentioned programs of cash and carry, lend-lease, neutrality zones, restoring conscription, increased defense appropriations, and secret war plans. In March 1941 Roosevelt informed the British that they could have their ships repaired in American docks, and that same month the president ordered the seizure of all Axis vessels in American ports. On April 10, Roosevelt extended the security zone all the way to the eastern coast of Greenland, negotiating the use of military bases on the island with a Danish official who did not have approval from his home government. If we add the various economic sanctions the president imposed on Japan, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Roosevelt was preparing the nation for war.23

Clare Boothe Luce surprised many people at the Republican Convention in 1944 by saying that Roosevelt “lied the American people into war because he could not lead them into it.” Once this statement proved to be true, the Roosevelt supporters ceased to deny it. Instead, they said Roosevelt was forced to lie to save his country and the rest of the world.

Sir Oliver Lyttelton, the British Minister of Productions in Churchill’s cabinet, confirms that the United States was not forced into war. Speaking before the American Chamber of Commerce in London in 1944, Lyttelton stated: “Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor. . . . It is a travesty of history to ever say America was forced into war.”24

On Dec. 8, 1941, Rep. Hamilton Fish made the first speech in Congress asking for a declaration of war against Japan. Fish later said that if he had known what Roosevelt had been doing to provoke Japan to attack, he never would have asked for a declaration of war. Fish states:

FDR deliberately goaded Japan into war. . . . Roosevelt was the main instigator and firebrand to light the fuse of war, abetted by the five members of his war cabinet. They were all sure that the Japanese would start the war by an undeclared strategic attack.

Roosevelt, through his numerous campaign pledges and also by the plank of the Democratic national platform against intervention, had tied himself in unbreakable peace knots. There was only one way out—to provoke Germany or Japan into attacking us. He tried in every way possible to incite the Germans to attack, but to no avail. The convoy of ships, and the shoot-at-sight order, were open and brazen efforts by the president to take the country into war against Germany, but Hitler avoided the lure.

The delay and virtual refusal to inform our Hawaiian commander is inconceivable, except as a part of a deceitful and concerted scheme of silence. . . . The tragedy of Pearl Harbor rests with FDR, not only because of the infamous war ultimatum, but for not making sure that Kimmel and Short were notified of the Japanese answer to the ultimatum.25

If Roosevelt’s secret policies had been known, the public demand for his impeachment would probably have been unstoppable. Fish states: “If the American people had known that they were deliberately tricked into a foreign war by Roosevelt in defiance of all his promises and pledges, there would have been political bombs exploding all over the United States, including demands for his resignation or impeach- ment.”26 Fish concludes: “Roosevelt had the opportunity to be a great peacemaker. Instead he chose to be a disastrous war maker.”27

Even biographers friendly to Roosevelt admit that until the last year when he was weighed down by physical illness, Roosevelt had never been as happy as during World War II. After the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt wrote a letter to George VI: “A truly mighty meeting. . . . As for Mr. Churchill and myself, I need not tell you that we make a perfectly matched team in harness and out—and incidentally we had lots of fun together, as we always do.”28

USSR Conspires to Foment WWII & Infiltrate U.S. Government

Stalin adopted three Five Year Plans beginning in 1927 designed to make the Soviet Union by far the greatest military power in the world. Stalin also conspired to start a major war in Europe by drawing Great Britain and France into war against Germany and other countries. Stalin’s plan was to eliminate one enemy with the hands of another. If Germany entered into a war with Great Britain and France, other countries would enter into the war and great destruction would follow. The Soviet Union could then invade Europe and easily take over the entire continent.

Stalin first attempted to start a major war in Europe in 1936 during the civil war in Spain. Stalin’s political agents, propagandists, diplomats, and spies in Spain all screamed in outrage that children were dying in Spain while Great Britain and France did nothing. However, Stalin’s agents were not able to spread the war beyond Spain’s borders. By the end of 1938, Stalin stopped all anti-Hitler propaganda to calm Hitler and to encourage him to attack Poland.

Stalin eventually forced war in Europe with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. British and French delegations had arrived in Moscow on Aug. 11, 1939, to discuss joint action against Germany. During the course of the talks, British and French delegates told the Soviets that if Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France would declare war against Germany. This was the information that Stalin needed to know. On Aug. 19, 1939, Stalin stopped the talks with Great Britain and France, and told the German ambassador in Moscow that he wanted to reach an agreement with Germany. Germany and the Soviet Union then signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, which resulted in the destruction and division of Poland.29

The Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement is remarkable in that Hitler repeatedly stated he hated communism and did not trust the leaders of the Soviet Union. Hitler writes in Mein Kampf:

It must never be forgotten that the present rulers of Russia are blood-stained criminals, that here we have the dregs of humanity which, favored by the circumstances of a tragic moment, overran a great State, degraded and extirpated millions of educated people out of sheer blood-lust, and that now for nearly ten years they have ruled with such a savage tyranny as was never known before. It must not be forgotten that these rulers belong to a people in whom the most bestial cruelty is allied with a capacity for artful mendacity and believes itself today more than ever called to impose its sanguinary despotism on the rest of the world. It must not be forgotten that the international Jew, who is today the absolute master of Russia, does not look upon Germany as an ally but as a State condemned to the same doom as Russia. One does not form an alliance with a partner whose only aim is the destruction of his fellow partner. Above all, one does not enter into alliances with people for whom no treaty is sacred; because they do not move about this earth as men of honor and sincerity but as the representatives of lies and deception, thievery and plunder and robbery. The man who thinks that he can bind himself by treaty with parasites is like the tree that believes it can form a profitable bargain with the ivy that surrounds it.30

Hitler also states in Mein Kampf: “Therefore the fact of forming an alliance with Russia would be the signal for a new war. And the result of that would be the end of Germany.”31

Hitler repeated his distrust of the Soviet Union in a conversation on March 3, 1938, with British Ambassador Nevile Henderson. Hitler stated in this conversation that any limitations on arms depended on the Soviet Union. Hitler noted that the problem was rendered particularly difficult “by the fact that one could place as much confidence in the faith in treaties of a barbarous creature like the Soviet Union as in the comprehension of mathematical formulae by a savage. Any agreement with the U.S.S.R. was quite worthless.” Hitler added that it was impossible, for example, to have faith in any Soviet agreement not to use poison gas.32

These statements by Hitler in Mein Kampf and to Nevile Henderson were prescient. Stalin had been conspiring to take over all of Europe ever since the 1920s. Stalin and the Soviet Union could not be trusted to uphold any peace agreement. However, Hitler decided to enter into the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement because Hitler was desperate to end the atrocities being committed against the ethnic Germans in Poland. Hitler was hoping that the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement would prevent Great Britain and France from declaring war against Germany.33

Hitler also signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement because the negotiations that had been ongoing between Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had taken on a threatening character for Germany. Hitler was confronted with the alternative of being encircled by this massive alliance coalition or ending it via diplomatic channels. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact prevented Germany from being encircled by these three powers.34

Stalin stayed out of the war in Europe he had conspired to instigate. Stalin kept the war in Europe going by supplying much needed supplies to Germany. However, Hitler’s swift victory over France prevented the massive destruction in Europe Stalin had hoped for. Molotov was sent to Germany in November 1940 to announce the Soviet Union’s new territorial demands in Europe. These new territorial demands effectively ended the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. Hitler was forced to launch a preemptive attack on June 22, 1941, to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering all of Europe.

The Soviet war effort in the European theater of World War II was enormous. Most historians underestimate the incredible power of the Soviet military. As historian Norman Davies states: “. . . the Soviet war effort was so overwhelming that impartial historians in the future are unlikely to rate the British and American contribution to the European theatre as much more than a supporting role. The proportions were not ‘Fifty-fifty’, as many imply when talking of the final onslaught on Nazi Germany from East and West. Sooner or later people will have to adjust to the fact that the Soviet role was enormous and the Western role was respectable but modest.”35

A crucial factor that prevented the Soviet takeover of Europe was the more than 400,000 non-German Europeans who volunteered to fight on the Eastern Front. Combined with 600,000 German troops, the 1,000,000 man Waffen-SS represented the first truly pan-European army to ever exist. The heroism of these non-German volunteers who joined the Waffen-SS prevented the planned Soviet conquest of Europe. In this regard, Waffen-SS Gen. Leon Degrelle states:

If the Waffen-SS had not existed, Europe would have been overrun entirely by the Soviets by 1944. They would have reached Paris long before the Americans. Waffen-SS heroism stopped the Soviet juggernaut at Moscow, Cherkov, Cherkassy and Tarnopol. The Soviets lost more than 12 months. Without SS resistance the Soviets would have been in Normandy before Eisenhower. The people showed deep gratitude to the young men who sacrificed their lives.36

The Soviet Union also conspired to have Japan attack the United States. Harry Dexter White, who was later proven to be a Soviet agent, carried out a mission to provoke Japan into war with the United States. When Secretary of State Cordell Hull allowed the peacemakers in Roosevelt’s administration to put together a modus vivendi that had real potential, White drafted a 10-point proposal that the Japanese were certain to reject. White passed a copy of his proposal to Hull, and this final American offer—the so-called “Hull note”—was presented to the Japanese on Nov. 26, 1941.37

The Hull note, which was based on two memoranda from White, was a declaration of war as far as the Japanese were concerned. The Hull note destroyed any possible peace settlement with the Japanese, and led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In this regard, historian John Koster writes:

Harry Dexter White, acting under orders from Soviet intelligence, pulled the strings by which Cordell Hull and [State Department expert on Far Eastern Affairs] Stanley Hornbeck handed the Japanese an ultimatum that was tantamount to a declaration of war—when both the Japanese cabinet and the U.S. military were desperately eager for peace. . . . Harry Dexter White knew exactly what he was doing. The man himself remains a mystery, but the documents speak for themselves. Harry Dexter White gave us Pearl Harbor.38

The Soviets had also planted numerous other agents in the Roosevelt administration. For example, Harold Glasser, a member of Morgenthau’s Treasury staff, provided intelligence from the War Department and the White House to the Soviets. Glasser’s reports were deemed so important by the NKVD that 74 reports generated from his material went directly to Stalin. One historian writes of the Soviet infiltration of the U.S. government and its effect on Roosevelt:

These spies, plus the hundreds in other U.S. agencies at the time, including the military and the OSS, permeated the administration in Washington, and, ultimately, the White House, surrounding FDR. He was basically in the Soviet’s pocket. He admired Stalin, sought his favor. Right or wrong, he thought the Soviet Union indispensable in the war, crucial to bringing world peace after it, and he wanted the Soviets handled with kid gloves. FDR was star struck. The Russians hardly could have done better if he was a Soviet spy.39

The opening of the Soviet archives in 1995 revealed that more than 300 communist members or supporters had infiltrated the American government. Working in Lend-Lease, the Treasury Department, the State Department, the office of the president, the office of the vice president, and even American intelligence operations, these spies constantly tried to shift U.S. policy in a pro-Soviet direction. During World War II several of these Soviet spies were well-positioned to influence American policy. Especially at the Tehran and Yalta meetings toward the end of World War II, the Soviet spies were able to influence Roosevelt to make huge concessions to the Soviet Union.40

CHURCHILL Conspires to Perpetuate WWII, Destroy Germany

Hitler had never wanted war with Great Britain. To Hitler, Great Britain was the natural ally of Germany and the nation he admired most. Hitler had no ambitions against Britain or her Empire, and all of the captured records solidly bear this out.41

Hitler had also never planned for a world war. British historian A.J.P. Taylor shatters the myth of a great German military buildup:

In 1938-39, the last peacetime year, Germany spent on armament about 15% of her gross national product. The British proportion was almost exactly the same. German expenditure on armaments was actually cut down after Munich and remained at this lower level, so that British production of aeroplanes, for example, was way ahead of German by 1940. When war broke out in 1939, Germany had 1,450 modern fighter planes and 800 bombers; Great Britain and France had 950 fighters and 1,300 bombers. The Germans had 3,500 tanks; Great Britain and France had 3,850. In each case Allied intelligence estimated German strength at more than twice the true figure. As usual, Hitler was thought to have planned and prepared for a great war. In fact, he had not.42

Taylor further states that Hitler was not intending or anticipating a major war:

He was not projecting a major war; hence it did not matter that Germany was not equipped for one. Hitler deliberately ruled out the “rearmament in depth” which was pressed on him by his technical advisors. He was not interested in preparing for a long war against the Great Powers. He chose instead “rearmament in width”—a frontline army without reserves, adequate only for a quick strike. Under Hitler’s direction, Germany was equipped to win the war of nerves—the only war he understood and liked; she was not equipped to conquer Europe. . . . In considering German armament we escape from the mystic regions of Hitler’s psychology and find an answer in the realm of fact. The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.43

Hitler was eager to make peace once Great Britain and France had declared war against Germany. Hitler confided to his inner circle: “If we on our side avoid all acts of war, the whole business will evaporate. As soon as we sink a ship and they have sizeable casualties, the war party over there will gain strength.”44 Hitler made a peace offer on Oct. 6, 1939, that was quickly rejected. No doubt the leaders of the Soviet Union, who wanted a general European war, were relieved by the quick rejection of Hitler’s offer.

Hitler dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance even when Germany was at war with Great Britain. Hitler biographer Alan Bullock states: “Even during the war Hitler persisted in believing that an alliance with Germany . . . was in Britain’s own interest, continually expressed his regret that the British had been so stupid as not to see this, and never gave up the hope that he would be able to overcome their obstinacy and persuade them to accept his view.”45

Germany’s offensive against Dunkirk was halted by Hitler’s order on May 24, 1940. German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt insists that his hands were tied by Hitler’s instructions. Hitler talked to von Rundstedt and two key men of his staff, Gens. Georg von Sodenstern and Guenther Blumentritt. As Gen. Blumentritt tells the story:

He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. . . . He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.46

Hitler told his friend Frau Troost: “The blood of every single Englishman is too valuable to be shed. Our two people belong together, racially and traditionally—this is and always has been my aim even if our generals can’t grasp it.”47

Hitler states in his Testament on Feb. 26, 1945: “Churchill was quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We ought to have been able to make them realize that the acceptance by them of the German hegemony established in Europe, a state of affairs to the implementation of which they had always been opposed, but which I had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable advantages.”48

Having been given the gift of Dunkirk by Hitler, Churchill refused to acknowledge it. Churchill instead described the evacuation of British troops off the beaches of Dunkirk as a heroic miracle accomplished by the British navy. Churchill became even more bellicose in his determination to continue the war.49

Hitler’s desire to preserve the British Empire was expressed on another occasion when the military fortunes of the Allies were at their lowest ebb. When France appealed for an armistice, von Ribbentrop gave the following summary of Hitler’s attitude toward Great Britain in a strictly private talk with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano:

He [Ribbentrop] said that in the Fuehrer’s opinion the existence of the British Empire as an element of stability and social order in the world is very useful. In the present state of affairs it would be impossible to replace it with another, similar organization. Therefore, the Fuehrer—as he has also recently stated in public—does not desire the destruction of the British Empire. He asks that England renounce some of its possessions and recognize the fait accompli. On these conditions Hitler would be prepared to come to an agreement.50

After Dunkirk, Ribbentrop wrote that Hitler was enthused with making a quick peace with England. Hitler outlined the peace terms he was prepared to offer the British: “It will only be a few points, and the first point is that nothing must be done between England and Germany which would in any way violate the prestige of Great Britain. Secondly, Great Britain must give us back one or two of our old colonies. That is the only thing we want.”51

On June 25, 1940, Hitler telephoned Joseph Goebbels to lay out the terms of an agreement with Great Britain. Goebbels wrote in his diary:

The Fuehrer . . . believes that the [British Empire] must be preserved if at all possible. For if it collapses, then we shall not inherit it, but foreign and even hostile powers take it over. But if England will have it no other way, then she must be beaten to her knees. The Fuehrer, however, would be agreeable to peace on the following basis: England out of Europe, colonies and mandates returned. Reparations for what was stolen from us after the World War. . . .52

Hitler took the initiative to end the war after the fall of France in June 1940. In a victory speech on July 19, 1940, Hitler declared that it had never been his intention to destroy or even harm the British Empire. Hitler made a general peace offer in the following words:

In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my conscience to appeal once more to reason and commonsense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor, speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on.53

This speech was followed by private diplomatic overtures to Great Britain through Sweden, the United States, and the Vatican. There is no question that Hitler was eager to end the war. But Churchill was in the war with the objective of destroying Germany. Churchill was not concerned with saving the British Empire from destruction. British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax also wanted the war to continue, and brushed aside what he called Hitler’s “summons to capitulate at his will.”54 Hitler’s peace offer was officially rejected on July 22, 1940.55

Alan Clarke, defense aid to Margaret Thatcher, believes that only Churchill’s obsession with Hitler and “single-minded determination to keep the war going” prevented his accepting Germany’s offer to end the war in 1940: “There were several occasions when a rational leader could have got, first reasonable, then excellent terms from Germany. Hitler actually offered peace in July 1940 before the Battle of Britain started. After the RAF victory, the German terms were still available, now weighed more in Britain’s favor.”56

On Aug. 14, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, Hitler called his field marshals into the Reich Chancellery to impress upon them that victory over Britain must not lead to the collapse of the British Empire:

Germany is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be Germany, but Japan in the east, Russia in India, Italy in the Mediterranean, and America in world trade. This is why peace is possible with Britain—but not so long as Churchill is prime minister. Thus we must see what the Luftwaffe can do, and wait a possible general election.57

Hitler continued to search for a way to end the war he had never wanted. On May 10, 1941, Deputy Fuehrer Rudolf Hess flew in a Messerschmitt 110 to Scotland to attempt to negotiate a peace settlement with Great Britain. On May 11, 1941, Rudolf Hess told the Duke of Hamilton why he had flown to Scotland: “I am on a mission of humanity. The Fuehrer does not want to defeat England and wants to stop fighting.”58

While it is impossible to prove that Hess flew to Scotland with Hitler’s knowledge and approval, the available evidence suggests that he did. The relationship between Hess and Hitler was so close that one can logically assume that Hess would not have undertaken such an important step without first informing Hitler. Also, Hess was prohibited from speaking openly about his mission during the entire 40-year period of his imprisonment in Spandau prison. This “gag order” was obviously imposed because Hess knew things that, if publicly known, would be highly embarrassing to the Allied governments.59

A peaceful settlement of the war was impossible after the announcement of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender at a press conference in Casablanca on Jan. 23, 1943. The Allied policy of unconditional surrender ensured that the war would be fought to its bitter end. Maurice Hankey, an experienced British statesman, summed up the effect of the unconditional surrender policy as follows:

It embittered the war, rendered inevitable a fight to the finish, banged the door to the possibility of either side offering terms or opening up negotiations, gave the Germans and the Japanese the courage of despair, strengthened Hitler’s position as Germany’s “only hope,” aided Goebbels’s propaganda, and made inevitable the Normandy landing and the subsequent terribly exhausting and destructive advance through North France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland and Germany. The lengthening of the war enabled Stalin to occupy the whole of Eastern Europe, to ring down the iron curtain and so to realize at one swoop a large installment of his avowed aims against so-called capitalism, in which he includes social democracy. . . . Not only the enemy countries, but nearly all countries were bled white by this policy, which has left us all, except the United States of America, impoverished and in dire straits. Unfortunately also, these policies, so contrary to the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, did nothing to strengthen the moral position of the Allies.60

Numerous other historians and political leaders have stated that Great Britain and the United States made it impossible for Germany to reach a peaceful resolution to the war. It is widely acknowledged that Hitler did not want a war with either Great Britain or the United States.61 Instead, Great Britain and the U.S. wanted war with Germany. In this regard, Rep. Hamilton Fish states:

If Roosevelt and Churchill had really wished to deliver the world from the menace of totalitarianism, they had their God-given opportunity on June 22, 1941. England could have withdrawn from the war and made peace with Hitler on the most favorable terms. Hitler had no designs whatever on the United States, so we would not have been endangered by this turn of events. Then Hitler and Stalin would have fought each other into exhaustion. This is exactly what the Baldwin-Chamberlain foreign policy had originally envisaged. Mr. Truman, then a senator, strongly supported this policy, as did Senator Vandenberg and many others. It would have left the United States and England dominant powers in the world, and they might have kept it a predominately free world.62

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had told Rep. Hamilton Fish that cooperation between England and Germany was essential for the maintenance of peace. Hitler had even “offered to place fifteen German army divisions and the entire fleet at the disposal of the British government to support her empire in case of war anywhere in the world.” Fish did not believe this statement from von Ribbentrop at the time, but it was substantiated years later.63

Hitler voiced his puzzlement to the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin at Great Britain’s refusal to accept his peace offers. Hitler felt he had repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and each time they had blacked his eye in reply. Hitler said, “The survival of the British Empire is in Germany’s interest too because if Britain loses India, we gain nothing thereby.”64

Even a diplomat from Churchill’s own Conservative Party admitted: “To the world at large, Churchill appeared to be the very embodiment of a policy of war. To have brought him into Government when the balance between peace and war was still quivering, might have definitely tilted the scales on the side of war.”65

The refusal of Winston Churchill to negotiate peace with Germany is remarkable in that Churchill spoke of the evils of communism. Churchill once said of communism:

It is not only a creed; it is a plan of campaign. A Communist is not only the holder of certain opinions, he is the pledge adept of a well-thought-out means of enforcing them. The anatomy of discontent and revolution has been studied in every phase and aspect, and a veritable drill book prepared in a scientific spirit of sabotaging all existing institutions. No faith need be kept with non-Communists. Every act of goodwill, or tolerance or conciliation or mercy or magnanimity on the part of governments or statesmen is to be utilized for their ruin. Then, when the time is ripe and the moment opportune, every form of lethal violence, from revolt to private assassination, must be used without stint or compunction. The citadel will be stormed under the banners of liberty and democracy, and once the apparatus of power is in the hands of the Brotherhood, all opposition, all contrary opinions must be extinguished by death. Democracy is but a tool to be used and afterwards broken.66

Despite his aversion to communism, Churchill ignored all German peace efforts and joined the Soviet Union in the war against Germany.

On Jan. 20, 1943, Joseph E. Davies disclosed that Hitler offered to retire from office if by doing so Great Britain would make peace with Germany. Churchill and other British leaders refused Hitler’s offer.67

Churchill never once attempted to make peace with Germany. In a Jan. 1, 1944, letter to Stalin, Churchill said: “We never thought of peace, not even in that year when we were completely isolated and could have made peace without serious detriment to the British Empire, and extensively at your cost. Why should we think of it now, when victory approaches for the three of us?”68

It is well known that Churchill loved war. The English publicist, F. S. Oliver, has written of Churchill: “From his youth up, Mr. Churchill has loved with all his heart, all his mind, and with all his soul, and with all his strength, three things: war, politics, and himself. He loved war for its dangers, he loved politics for the same reason, and himself he has always loved for the knowledge that his mind is dangerous. . . .”69 Churchill always wanted to continue the war against Germany rather than negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Even leaders of the German resistance movement discovered that the Allied policy of unconditional surrender would not change with Hitler dead. On July 18, 1944, Otto John returned from fruitless negotiations with Allied representatives in Madrid and informed his fellow plotters that unconditional surrender would be in place even if they succeeded in killing Hitler.

Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, a former conspirator and president of the West German Parliament after the war, stated in a 1975 interview: “What we in the German resistance during the war did not want to see, we learned in full measure afterward; that this war was ultimately not waged against Hitler, but against Germany.”70

Great Britain Practices Uncivilized Warfare

In addition to ignoring all German efforts to make peace, Churchill and other leaders of Great Britain began to conduct a war of unprecedented violence. On July 3, 1940, a British fleet attacked and destroyed much of the French fleet at Oran in southwestern Algeria to prevent it from falling into German hands. The French navy went to the bottom of the sea, and with it 1,297 French sailors. Churchill and the British government did not seem to mind that 1,297 of their French ally’s sailors were killed in the attack. This attack of the French fleet illustrates Churchill’s determination to continue fighting Hitler “no matter what the cost.”71

A surprising aspect of the British attack on the French fleet is that low-flying British airplanes repeatedly machine-gunned masses of French sailors as they struggled in the water. It is an event still remembered with great bitterness in France. This deliberate British war crime was soon followed by the assassination of French Adm. Darlan by British agents in Algiers.72

Great Britain also began to violate the essential rule of civilized warfare that hostilities must be limited to the combatant forces. On May 11, 1940, British bombers began to attack the industrial areas of Germany. The British government adopted a new definition of military objectives so that this term included any building which in any way contributed, directly or indirectly, to the war effort of the enemy.

On Dec. 16, 1940, a moonlight raid by 134 British planes took place on Mannheim designed “to concentrate the maximum amount of damage in the center of the town.” Great Britain abandoned all pretense of attacking military, industrial, or any other particular target with this raid.73

After France surrendered on June 22, 1940, for about a month Hitler clung to the hope that the war could be brought to an end by a negotiated peace. Once Hitler realized that a negotiated peace was impossible, Hitler launched a massive air attack on Britain in order to win command of the air. The German air attacks were purely a military operation, carried out mainly in daylight, against airfields, docks and shipping. It was not until Sept. 6, 1940, that the German Luftwaffe was ordered to launch a reprisal air offensive against Great Britain. These German reprisal attacks were exactly similar to the British air attacks against Germany which had been going on ever since May 11, 1940.

The two air offensives continued concurrently until the spring of 1941, when the Luftwaffe was withdrawn to take part in the invasion of the Soviet Union. The German air offensive was a complete failure in that it did not achieve its sole purpose of inducing the British government to discontinue the air offensive against Germany. The British air offensive was a failure to the extent that it did nothing towards crippling Germany’s war production. However, it was a huge success to the extent that it generated a frenzied war psychosis in Great Britain and prevented the war from stagnating. The British public incorrectly believed that the British air offensive against Germany was merely a justified reprisal for the attacks of the Luftwaffe on Great Britain. The British public did not realize that it was Great Britain that had initiated the air attacks.74

On March 28, 1942, the British air offensive against Germany initiated Frederick Lindemann’s bombing plan. The Lindemann Plan, which continued with undiminished ferocity until the end of the war, concentrated on bombing German working-class houses. The British bombing during this period was simple terror bombing designed to shatter the morale of the German civilian population and thereby generate an inclination to surrender. The bombing focused on working-class houses built close together because a higher percentage of bloodshed per ton of explosives dropped could be expected as opposed to bombing higher class houses surrounded by large yards and gardens.75

The climax of the British bombing offensive under the Lindemann Plan was reached on the night of Feb. 13, 1945, when a massive bombing raid was directed against Dresden. The population of Dresden was swollen by a horde of terrified German women and children running from the advancing Soviet army. No one will ever know exactly how many people died in the bombing of Dresden, but estimates of 250,000 or more civilian deaths appear to be reasonable. The bombing of Dresden served no military purpose; it was designed solely to terrify the German civilian population and break their will to continue the war.76

A horrifying aspect of the Dresden terror bombings occurred during the daylight hours of Feb. 14, 1945. On this day low-flying British fighters machine-gunned thousands of helpless Germans as they rushed toward the Elbe River in a desperate attempt to escape the inferno. Since Dresden had no air defense, the German civilians were easy targets.77

As word of the savage bombings of innocent German civilians began to filter to the outside world, the British government initially denied the slaughter. British leaders declared that the targets of the British air offensive were always military in nature. Despite the persistent government denials, the truth of the British mass bombings of civilian targets could not be suppressed forever. Critics of the civilian bombings became concerned about the moral demise of Great Britain. For example, British historian Basil Liddell Hart stated: “It will be ironical if the defenders of civilization depend for victory upon the most barbaric, and unskilled, way of winning a war that the modern world has seen. . . . We are now counting for victory on success in the way of degrading it to a new level—as represented by indiscriminate (night) bombing.”78

Evidence of the ruthless mass bombings of congested German cities was provided by many of the British bomber crews themselves. The almost total lack of German opposition to the British bombings toward the end of the war made the bombing of cities less like war and more like murder. While open criticism of government policy was not allowed, the guilt of young British flyers occasionally surfaced. One British crewman confessed: “There were people down there being fried to death in melted asphalt in the roads, they were being burnt up and we were shuffling incendiary bombs into this holocaust. I felt terribly sorry for the people in the fire I was helping to stoke up.”79

After the destruction of Dresden, outrage was directed at Arthur Harris, the British Chief of Bomber Command. Once known affectionately by his men as “Bomber” Harris, after Dresden many of his men nicknamed him “Butcher” Harris. One angry British crewman later explained: “We were told at the briefing that there were many thousands of Panzer troops in the streets [of Dresden], either going to or coming back from the Russian Front. My personal feeling is that if we’d been told the truth at the briefing, some of us wouldn’t have gone.”80

Winston Churchill, the man directly responsible for the Dresden holocaust, began to publicly distance himself from the terror bombings. Churchill stated to Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the British Air Staff, on March 28, 1945:

It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts should be reviewed. The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. . . . I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.81

In spite of Churchill’s protests, the British terror bombing continued unabated until the end of the war. On May 3, 1945, the British Royal Air Force attacked the German Cap Arcona and Thielbek passenger ships. Both of these ships were flying many large white flags with huge Red Cross emblems painted on the sides of the ships. The British attacks, which were a violation of international law, resulted in the deaths of approximately 7,000 prisoners being shipped from the Neuengamme concentration camp to Stockholm. When large numbers of corpses dressed in concentration camp garb washed ashore the German coastline a few days later, the British claimed the Germans had intentionally drowned the prisoners in the Baltic Sea. It took years for the truth of the illegal British attacks to be made public.82

After Dresden, Joseph Goebbels angrily urged Hitler to retaliate by abrogating the Geneva Convention. However, Hitler and his military staff continued to abide by the Geneva Convention throughout the war. As a result, almost 99% of Allied prisoners of war survived the war to return home.83

Like Winston Churchill, other British leaders responsible for the terror bombings began distancing themselves from the deeds when the details of atrocities at Dresden and other places became publicly known. British commander Sir Arthur Harris insisted he was only following orders from “higher up.” Harris and other Allied leaders actually had very little to fear. The Allies had, after all, won the war. With an army of journalists, film makers, and historians to cover their tracks, none of the Allied war criminals risked being held accountable for their crimes.84

Allies Conspire to Allow STALIN to Control Eastern Europe

In addition to not negotiating peace with Germany and practicing uncivilized warfare, the Allied leaders intentionally allowed the Soviet Union to take over Berlin and Eastern Europe. The Supreme Allied Commander in the West, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, had no intention of occupying Berlin. According to Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, “Stalin said that if it hadn’t been for Eisenhower, we wouldn’t have succeeded in capturing Berlin.”85

Stalin wanted his troops to reach as far into Europe as possible to enable the Soviet Union to control more of Europe after the war was over. Stalin knew that once the Soviet troops had a stronghold in Eastern Europe, it would be almost impossible to dislodge them. Soviet hegemony could not be dislodged unless Roosevelt wanted to take on the Soviet Union after fighting Germany. Stalin said in private: “Whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach.”86

The United States could have easily prevented the Soviet Union from marching so far west into Europe. After defeating Germany in North Africa, the Americans and British went into Sicily and then Italy. Churchill favored an advance up the Italian or Balkan peninsulas into central Europe. Such a march would be quicker in reaching Berlin, but Roosevelt and Stalin opposed this strategy at the Tehran Conference in November 1943. In general sessions at Tehran with Churchill present, Roosevelt opposed strengthening the Italian campaign. Instead, Roosevelt wanted troops in Italy to go to France for the larger cross-Channel attack planned for 1944.87

Gen. Mark Clark, the American commander in Italy, later commented on Roosevelt’s decision: “The weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding mistakes of the war. . . . Stalin knew exactly what he wanted . . . and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans.”88

The Allied military leaders also intentionally prevented Gen. George Patton from quickly defeating Germany in Western Europe. In August 1944, Patton’s Third Army was presented with an opportunity to encircle the Germans at Falaise, France. However, Gens. Omar Bradley and Dwight Eisenhower ordered Patton to stop at Argentan and not complete the encirclement of the Germans, which most historians agree Patton could have done. As a result, probably 100,000 or more German soldiers escaped to later fight U.S. troops in December 1944 in the last-ditch counterattack known as the Battle of the Bulge.89

Patton wrote in his diary concerning the halt that prevented the encirclement of Germans at Falaise: “This halt [was] a great mistake. [Bradley’s] motto seems to be, ‘In case of doubt, halt.’ I wish I were supreme commander.”90

Maj. Gen. Richard Rohmer, who was a Canadian fighter pilot at the time, wrote that if the gap had closed it “could have brought the surrender of the Third Reich, whose senior generals were now desperately concerned about the ominous shadow of the great Russian Bear rising on the eastern horizon of the Fatherland.” Even Col. Ralph Ingersoll, Gen. Bradley’s own historian, wrote, “The failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap was the loss of the greatest single opportunity of the war.”91

By Aug. 31, 1944, Patton had put Falaise behind and quickly advanced his tanks to the Meuse River, only 63 miles from the German border and 140 miles from the Rhine River. The German army Patton was chasing was disorganized and in disarray; nothing could stop Patton from roaring into Germany. However, on August 31, the Third Army’s gasoline allotment was suddenly cut by 140,000 gallons per day. This was a huge chunk of the 350,000 to 400,000 gallons per day the Third Army had been consuming. Patton’s advance was halted even though the way ahead was open and largely undefended by the German army in retreat.

Siegfried Westphal, Gen. von Rundstedt’s chief of staff, later described the condition of the German army on the day Patton was stopped: “The overall situation in the West [for the Germans] was serious in the extreme. The Allies could have punched through at any point with ease.” The halt of the Third Army blitzkrieg allowed the Germans to reposition and revitalize. With the knowledge that they were defending their home soil, the Germans found a new purpose for fighting. They were not just waging a war, but were defending their families from what they regarded as revenge seeking hordes.92

Germany took advantage of the overall Allied slowdown and reorganized her troops into a major fighting force. Germany’s counterattack in the Battle of the Bulge took Allied forces completely by surprise. The Germans created a “bulge” in the lax American line, and the Allies ran the risk of being cut off and possibly annihilated or thrown back into the sea. Patton had to pull back his Third Army in the east and begin another full scale attack on the southern flank of the German forces. Patton’s troops arrived in a matter of days and were the crucial factor in pushing the German bulge back into Germany.93

Patton was enthused after the Battle of the Bulge and wanted to quickly take his Third Army into the heart of Germany. The German army had no more reserves and was definitely on its last legs. However, once again Patton was held back by Gen Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff led by Gen. Marshall. Patton was dumbfounded. Patton wrote: “I’ll be damned if I see why we have divisions if not to use them. One would think people would like to win a war . . . we will be criticized by history, and rightly so, for having sat still so long.”94

The Western Allies were still in a position to easily capture Berlin. However, Eisenhower ordered a halt of American troops on the Elbe River, thereby in effect presenting a gift to the Soviet Union of central Germany and much of Europe. One American Staff officer bitterly commented: “No German force could have stopped us. The only thing that stood between [the] Ninth Army and Berlin was Eisenhower.”95

On May 8, 1945, the day the war in Europe officially ended, Patton spoke his mind in an “off the record” press briefing. With tears in his eyes, Patton recalled those “who gave their lives in what they believed was the final fight in the cause of freedom.” Patton continued:

I wonder how [they] will speak today when they know that for the first time in centuries we have opened Central and Western Europe to the forces of Genghis Khan. I wonder how they feel now that they know there will be no peace in our times and that Americans, some not yet born, will have to fight the Russians tomorrow, or 10, 15 or 20 years from tomorrow. We have spent the last months since the Battle of the Bulge and the crossing of the Rhine stalling; waiting for Montgomery to get ready to attack in the North; occupying useless real estate and killing a few lousy Huns when we should have been in Berlin and Prague. And this Third Army could have been. Today we should be telling the Russians to go to hell instead of hearing them tell us to pull back. We should be telling them if they didn’t like it to go to hell and invite them to fight. We’ve defeated one aggressor against mankind and established a second far worse, more evil and more dedicated than the first.96

A few days later Patton shocked everyone at a Paris hotel gathering by saying basically the same things. At a later gathering in Berlin, when asked to drink a toast with a Soviet general, Patton told his translator, “tell that Russian sonovabitch that from the way they are acting here, I regard them as enemies and I’d rather cut my throat than have a drink with one of my enemies!”97

Patton became known among U.S. and Soviet leaders as a bona fide menace and a threat to world peace. In addition, Patton was viewed as insubordinate, uncontrollable, and, in the eyes of some, treasonous. Douglas Bazata claims to have been given the order to assassinate Patton by the Office of Strategic Services, an American military espionage ring. Bazata says he shot Patton during a planned auto wreck of Patton’s vehicle on Dec. 9, 1945. Patton later died in a hospital on Dec. 21, 1945, under very suspicious circumstances.98

Did Germany Conspire to Start World War II?

No confirmation has ever been found in German archives that Germany conspired to instigate World War II. The Axis powers also never had a clear-cut plan for achieving world domination. Gen. George Marshall points out in a report titled The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific that there was never close cooperation among the Axis powers. Marshall’s report, which was published after the war, was based on American intelligence reports and interviews with captured German commanders. Marshall’s report contains the following statements:

No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan. . . .

When Italy entered the war Mussolini’s strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshal Keitel reveals that Italy’s declaration of war was contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired. . . .

Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea and air forces in the Far East.

In the absence of anything so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan. . . .

Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord. The Axis as a matter of fact existed on paper only.99

Hitler confirms the lack of military coordination between Germany and Italy in his Testament. Hitler states:

Even while they proved themselves incapable of maintaining their positions in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw themselves, without seeking our advice and without even giving us previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless campaign in Greece. The shameful defeats which they suffered caused certain of the Balkan States to regard us with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere else, are to be found the causes of Yugoslavia’s stiffening and her volte-face in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the presence of any of our troops would have been quite unnecessary.100

British historian A.J.P. Taylor agrees that Hitler did not conspire to instigate war or conquer the world. Taylor states: “Hitler did not make plans—for world conquest or anything else. He assumed that others would provide opportunities, and that he would seize them.”101

Could Germany Have Averted World War II?

A review of the historical record indicates that it would have been extremely difficult for Germany to have averted World War II.

Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933 determined to free Germany from the Versailles Treaty’s onerous provisions. The Treaty of Versailles was a deliberate violation of the pre-Armistice contract that was to be based on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Germany was forced to sign the Versailles Treaty against her will and to admit sole responsibility for the origin of World War I. Consequently, Germany had to pay burdensome reparations to the Allies, lost large amounts of her territory including all of her colonies, and was left defenseless against potential enemies. By 1928, historians had documented that Germany was not primarily responsible for originating World War I.102 The Allies, however, refused to renounce or modify the Versailles Treaty.

Hitler’s determination to free Germany from the Versailles Treaty was entirely justified. No responsible leader would have allowed his nation to be subject to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty forever. Hitler began to rearm Germany beginning in March 1935. On March 7, 1936, Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland to protect Germany’s western borders from invasion by constructing the Siegfried Line. Great Britain and France did not challenge Hitler’s move because there was a general feeling that Germany was only asserting a right of sovereignty within her own borders.

The impetus toward World War II began with the Anschluss in March 1938. Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg of Austria announced on March 9, 1938, that Austria would hold a plebiscite four days later to decide if Austria would remain forever independent of Germany. The proposed plebiscite was a total farce in that, among other reasons, only a yes ballot for independence was issued from the government. Anyone wishing to vote no had to provide their own ballot, the same size as the yes ballots, with nothing on it but the word no. Hitler marched into Austria with his army to stop the phony plebiscite.

The Anschluss with Germany was hugely popular among the Austrian people. Austria had been part of Germany for more than 1,000 years prior to World War I. The legislators of Austria had voted to join Germany after World War I, but the architects of the Versailles Treaty refused to abide by the desire of the Austrian legislators. The Anschluss was regarded by most Austrians as an act of liberation from a hated puppet regime.103 However, even though not a shot was fired, by using his army Hitler lost the asset of aggrieved morality. Hitler appeared to the world for the first time as a conqueror relying on force.

A crisis later developed when the Czech government and military leaders decided on May 20, 1938, to order a partial mobilization of the Czech armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the lie that German troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. President Benes and other Czech leaders then lied to the world press that Czechoslovakia had forced Germany to back down. Hitler was furious and decided that the desire of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia to return to Germany should now be fulfilled.

The threat of war ended when the Munich Agreement was signed on Sept. 30, 1938, by Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy. Hitler got substantially everything he wanted, and the Sudeten Germans returned to the Reich. Similar to the Anschluss with Austria, the Sudeten Germans regarded the Munich Agreement as an act of liberation from a hated regime. The British war enthusiasts, however, denounced the Munich Agreement as an inappropriate appeasement of Germany. The warmongering that led to World War II began to increase in Great Britain.

After the Munich Agreement, a crisis developed in Czechoslovakia when Slovakia declared her independence from Czech rule on March 14, 1939. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia that followed occurred without the design or encouragement from Germany. The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia established on March 16, 1939, was legalized by agreements signed with the Czech and Slovak leaders. German troops occupied Prague for over a month to provide stability pursuant to these agreements. Hitler acted only when events had already destroyed the settlement of Munich. Most people outside Germany, however, thought Hitler had intentionally planned the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

Halifax hypocritically expressed his hostile views concerning Germany’s occupation of Prague, and promised that Hitler would be forced to shed blood the next time. British officials said that Hitler had overstepped his bounds, and that his word could never be trusted again. The truth is that Halifax and other British officials did not care about Czechoslovakia. They were merely using the Czech crisis as a means to stir up hostility toward Germany among the British public.104

In hindsight, Hitler’s establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia proved to be a tactical mistake. It probably would have been better for Hitler not to have involved Germany in the resolution of the Czech crisis. This would have prevented the British warmongers from claiming that Hitler had violated the Munich Agreement.

Halifax also supported the hoax that Germany was seeking to obtain control of the entire Romanian economy, and that Germany had terrified Romanian leaders with an ultimatum. Halifax continued to support these claims even after their falsehood had been exposed. Halifax made these and other false claims in order to further turn the British public’s opinion against Germany. Obviously, Hitler could not have prevented Halifax from making these lies against him.

The impetus for war continued when Great Britain announced an unconditional unilateral guarantee of Poland’s independence on March 31, 1939. This unprecedented blank check to Poland obligated Great Britain to go to war if the Poles decided war was necessary. Polish authorities proceeded to instigate numerous acts of murder, beatings, deportation and discrimination against the Germans of Poland and Danzig. It was “open season” on the Germans in Poland. Hitler soon had more than sufficient justification to go to war with Poland based on traditional practices among nations.

British Ambassador Nevile Henderson tried to inform Halifax of these Polish atrocities, but Halifax refused to listen. Halifax was interested in Poland only as a means of fomenting war against Germany. Polish newspapers recklessly admitted that Polish units were constantly crossing the German frontier to destroy German military installations and to carry confiscated German military equipment into Poland. Józef Beck also refused any peace negotiations with Germany.

The leaders of the German minority in Poland repeatedly appealed to the Polish government for mercy during this period, but to no avail. More than 80,000 German refugees had been forced to leave Poland by Aug. 20, 1939, and virtually all other ethnic Germans in Poland were clamoring to leave to escape Polish atrocities.105

Hitler was forced to invade Poland to end these atrocities against Poland’s ethnic German minority. Hitler had hoped the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement would persuade Great Britain not to declare war on Germany. However, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany two days after Germany’s invasion of Poland.

Hitler planned to offer to restore sovereignty to the Czech state and to Western Poland as part of a peace proposal with Great Britain and France. Joachim von Ribbentrop informed Soviet leaders of Hitler’s intention in a note on Sept. 15, 1939. Stalin and Molotov sought to stifle any action that might bring Germany and the Allies to the conference table. They told Ribbentrop that they did not approve of the resurrection of the Polish state. Aware of Germany’s dependency on Soviet trade, Hitler abandoned his plan to reestablish Polish statehood.106

Numerous historians who blame Hitler for starting World War II claim that if Hitler had wanted peace he would not have been so impatient to undo the Versailles Treaty. In reality Hitler was responding to the actions of the Austrian, Czech, and Polish leaders. American historian David Hoggan writes:

Schuschnigg had challenged Germany with a fraudulent anti-German plebiscite scheme, and Hitler responded by intervening in Austria. Benes challenged Germany with a Czech mobilization based on the false claim of German troop concentrations on the Czech frontier. Hitler responded with his decision to liberate the Sudetenland from Czech rule in 1938. Beck challenged Germany with a partial mobilization and a threat of war, and Hitler, who deeply desired friendship with Poland, refrained from responding at all. It was not until Beck joined the British encirclement front that Hitler took precautionary military measures against the Polish threat. It would have been incompatible with the security of Germany to refrain from doing so, after the formation of a hostile Anglo-Polish combination. The charge that Hitler did not know how to wait can be applied more appropriately to the Austrian, Czech, and Polish leaders.107

Harry Elmer Barnes agreed with Hoggan’s analysis. Barnes stated: “The primary responsibility for the outbreak of the German-Polish War was that of Poland and Britain, while for the transformation of the German-Polish conflict into a European War, Britain, guided by Halifax, was almost exclusively responsible.”108

Barnes further stated: “It has now been irrefutably established on a documentary basis that Hitler was no more responsible for war in 1939 than the Kaiser was in 1914, if indeed as responsible. . . . Hitler’s responsibility in 1939 was far less than that of Beck in Poland, Halifax in England or even Daladier in France.”109

Dr. Barnes also disputed the generally accepted theory of Hitler’s diabolism. Barnes stated that some very well informed people contended that Hitler was too soft, generous and honorable rather than too tough and ruthless. They point to the following considerations:

[Hitler] made a genuine and liberal peace offer to Britain on August 25, 1939; he permitted the British to escape at Dunkirk to encourage Britain to make peace, which later on cost him the war in North Africa; he failed to occupy all of France, take North Africa at once, and split the British Empire; he lost the Battle of Britain by failing to approve the savagery of saturation bombing of civilians and to build armed bombers to carry on this type of military barbarism which played so large a role in the Allied victory; he delayed his attack on Russia and offered Molotov lavish concessions in November, 1940, to keep peace between Germany and Russia; he lost the war with Russia by delaying the invasion in order to bail Mussolini out of his idiotic attack on Greece; and he declared war on the United States to keep his pledged word with Japan which had long before made it clear that it deserved no such consideration and loyalty from Hitler.110

The Allies had planned a long and devastating war resulting in the complete destruction of Germany. This is indicated by a conversation on Nov. 21, 1938, between William Bullitt and Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki. According to what military experts told Bullitt during the fall-crisis of 1938, a war lasting at least six years would break out in Europe. In the military experts’ opinion the war would result in the complete destruction of Europe, with communism reigning in all European states. The benefits would accrue to the Soviet Union at the conclusion of the war. Bullitt, who enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt, also told Potocki that the United States would take part in the war after Great Britain and France had made the first move. The complete destruction of Germany and the communist takeover of Eastern Europe occurred exactly as Bullitt had predicted.111

It is difficult to see how Hitler could have avoided war in Europe no matter what policies he adopted. Even if Hitler had passively accepted the chains of the Versailles Treaty and did nothing to rearm, the Soviet Union would have eventually attacked Germany and taken over all of Europe.

The Lawless Allied Conspiracy Against Modern Civilization

In his final statement at the Nuremberg trial, Hermann Goering said he “did not want a war” and “did not bring it about.” Franz von Papen was beside himself. At the lunch break he furiously attacked Goering: “Who in the world is responsible for all this destruction if not you? You haven’t taken the responsibility for anything! All you do is make bombastic speeches. It is disgraceful!” Goering laughed at Papen in response.112

Goering was correct that Germany was not primarily responsible for starting World War II. Adolf Hitler and National Socialist Germany had not wanted a war. Instead, the historical record clearly indicates that the Allied leaders had conspired to both instigate and prolong World War II. It was the Allied leaders who had engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.

In addition to the Allied leaders, the Western press showed no constraint when it came to stirring up hatred against Germany. Germany was constantly portrayed as a threat to other nations. In this regard, Hitler remarked in his Reichstag speech on April 28, 1939:

As far as Germany is concerned, I am not aware that threats of that kind are being made against other nations; but I do read every day in the democratic newspapers lies about these threats. I read every day of German mobilization, of landings, of extortions and that against countries with whom we are living not only in perfect tranquility, but with whom we have, in many cases, a deep friendship.

[T]hen it is criminal negligence, not to use a stronger expression, when heads of nations, who have at their disposal the power, are incapable of tightening the reins of the war-mongering press and so keep the world safe from the threatening disaster of a military conflict.113

The Allied nations and the Western press did more than conspire to start a world war leading to the complete destruction of Germany. The historical record shows that the Allies were planning a devastating treatment of Germany after the end of the war. In the next three chapters we will examine the horrific Allied crimes committed against the German people after the end of World War II.


1 Aug. 26, 1944, memorandum from Roosevelt to Stimson, in Morgenthau Diary (Germany), Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: Senate Judiciary Committee, 1967, p. 445. Quoted in Hitchcock, William I., The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe, New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 171.

2 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, p. 83.

3 Greaves, Percy L. Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 410.

4 Feb. 12, 1946, conversation between William Bullitt and Henry Wallace, from Henry Wallace Diary, Henry Wallace Papers, Library of Congress Manuscripts, Washington, D.C. Quoted in Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 240.

5 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, pp. 254-255.

6 Greaves, Percy L. Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 409.

7 Beard, Charles A., President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, pp. 306-307.

8 Greaves, Percy L. Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 409, 466.

9 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, pp. 255-257.

10 Ibid., Preface, pp. XIII-XIV.

11 Ibid., pp. 203-204.

12 Theobald, Robert A., The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, Old Greenwich, CT: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954, pp. 192, 198, 201.

13 Ibid., pp. 193-195.

14 Ibid., Foreword, pp. vii-viii.

15 Kimmel, Husband E., Admiral Kimmel’s Story, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955, p. 110.

16 Ibid., p. 186.

17 Richardson, James O., On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, p. 450.

18 Kimmel, Thomas K. Jr., “Kimmel and Short: Vindicated,” The Barnes Review, Vol. IX, No. 2, March/April 2003, p. 42.

19 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War Within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 26.

20 Barnes, Harry Elmer, Barnes Against the Blackout, Costa Mesa, CA: The Institute for Historical Review, 1991, pp. 285-286.

21 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 352.

22 Ibid., p. 364.

23 Fischer, Klaus P., Hitler and America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, p. 140.

24 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, pp. xi-xii.

25 Ibid., pp. 139, 149-150.

26 Ibid., p. 150.

27 Ibid., p. 76.

28 Ibid., p. 116.

29 Suvorov, Viktor, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, pp. 106-108.

30 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, translated by James Murphy, London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 1939, p. 364.

31 Ibid.

32 Henderson, Sir Nevile, Failure of a Mission, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, p. 115.

33 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 472.

34 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, pp. 385-386.

35 Davies, Norman, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, New York: Viking Penguin, 2007, p. 483.

36 Degrelle, Leon Gen., Hitler Democrat, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2012, p. 11.

37 Koster, John, Operation Snow, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012, pp. 135-137, 169.

38 Ibid., p. 215.

39 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 250-251.

40 Folsom, Burton W. Jr. and Anita, FDR Goes to War, New York: Threshold Editions, 2011, pp. 242, 245.

41 Irving, David, Hitler’s War, New York: Avon Books, 1990, p. 3.

42 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. xxi.

43 Ibid., pp. 217-218.

44 Buchanan, Patrick J., Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, New York: Crown Publishers, 2008, p. 331.

45 Bullock, Alan, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 337.

46 Hart, B. H. Liddell, The Other Side of the Hill, London: Papermac, 1970, pp. 200-201; see also Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 76.

47 Ibid.

48 Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 72-73.

49 Bradberry, Benton L., The Myth of German Villainy, Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2012, p. 369.

50 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, London: Odhams Press, 1948, p. 373.

51 Hinsley, F.H., Hitler’s Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 81.

52 Ferguson, Niall, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Power Order and the Lessons of Global Power, New York: Basic, 2003, pp. 330-331.

53 Hitler, Adolf, My New Order, Edited with commentary by Raoul de Roussy de Sales, New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941, p. 837.

54 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 84.

55 Hinsley, F.H., Hitler’s Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 82.

56 Clark, Alan, “A Reputation Ripe for Revision,” London Times, Jan. 2, 1993.

57 Denman, Roy, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Indigo, 1997, p. 130.

58 Langer, Howard J., World War II: An Encyclopedia of Quotations, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999, p. 142.

59 Hess, Wolf Ruediger, “The Life and Death of My Father, Rudolf Hess,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 1993, pp. 29, 31.

60 Hankey, Maurice Pascal Alers, Politics, Trials and Errors, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 125-126.

61 Fischer, Klaus P., Hitler and America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, p. 2.

62 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, p. 115.

63 Ibid., p. 87.

64 Irving, David, Hitler’s War, New York: Avon Books, 1990, p. 236.

65 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, p. 272.

66 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, p. 51.

67 Walsh, Michael, Hidden Truths About the Second World War, United Kingdom: The Historical Review Press, 2012, p. 15.

68 Walendy, Udo, The Methods of Reeducation, Vlotho/Weser, Germany: Verlag für Volkstum und Zeitgeschichtsforschung, 1979, p. 3.

69 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, pp. 115-116.

70 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, p. 257.

71 Fischer, Klaus P., Hitler and America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, pp. 122-123.

72 Bird, Vivian, “An Examination of British War Crimes During World War II,” The Barnes Review, Vol. VI, No. 6, Nov. /Dec. 2000, p. 56.

73 Veale, Frederick J. P., Advance to Barbarism, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 182-183.

74 Ibid., p. 183.

75 Ibid., pp. 184-185.

76 Ibid., pp. 185-186, 192-193.

77 Bird, Vivian, “An Examination of British War Crimes During World War II,” The Barnes Review, Vol. VI, No. 6, Nov. /Dec. 2000, p. 59.

78 Goodrich, Thomas, Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany 1944-1947, Sheridan, CO: Aberdeen Books, 2010, pp. 36-37.

79 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

80 Ibid., p. 124.

81 Veale, Frederick J. P., Advance to Barbarism, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 194.

82 “The 1945 Sinking of the Cap Arcona and the Thielbek,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, July/Aug. 2000, pp. 2-3; see also Schmidt, Hans, Hitler Boys in America: Re-Education Exposed, Pensacola, FL: Hans Schmidt Publications, 2003, pp. 231-232.

83 Goodrich, Thomas, Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany 1944-1947, Sheridan, CO: Aberdeen Books, 2010, pp. 126-127.

84 Ibid., pp. 344-345.

85 Nadaeu, Remi, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe, New York: Praeger, 1990, p. 163.

86 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 318.

87 Folsom, Burton W. Jr. and Anita, FDR Goes to War, New York: Threshold Editions, 2011, pp. 237-238.

88 Ibid., pp. 238-239.

89 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 284-288.

90 Blumenson, Martin, ed., The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974, pp. 508, 511.

91 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, p. 288.

92 Ibid., pp. 290-298.

93 Ibid., pp. 300-301.

94 Ibid., p. 313.

95 Lucas, James, Last Days of the Reich—The Collapse of Nazi Germany, May 1945, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986, p. 196.

96 Wilcox, Robert K., Target: Patton, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 331-332.

97 Ibid., p. 333.

98 Ibid., pp. 342, 391.

99 Marshall, George C., General Marshall’s Report—The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific. Published for the War Department in cooperation with the Council on Books in Wartime, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 1-3. Quoted in Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 351.

100 Fraser, L. Craig, The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, pp. 46-47.

101 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. 134.

102 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 6.

103 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 98.

104 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 204-205.

105 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 358, 382, 388, 391-92, 479.

106 Tedor, Richard, Hitler’s Revolution, Chicago: 2013, pp. 160-161.

107 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 312.

108 Barnes, Harry Elmer, Barnes Against the Blackout, Costa Mesa, CA: The Institute for Historical Review, 1991, p. 222.

109 Ibid., pp. 227, 249.

110 Ibid., pp. 251-252.

111 Count Jerzy Potocki to Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, The German White Paper: Full Text of the Polish Documents Issued by the Berlin Foreign Office; with a forward by C. Hartley Grattan, New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, 1940, pp. 19-21.

112 Taylor, Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992, pp. 535-536.

113 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, pp. 34-35.

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