Rescuing World War II, Chapter II

Germany’s War by John Wear. Chapter II: Franklin D. Roosevelt and America’s Second Crusade:

Most historians portray President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a lover of peace and democracy who had to involve the United States in World War II to stop fascist aggression. However, as we shall see in the following discussion, Franklin Roosevelt and his administration secretly made every effort to instigate war in Europe. Roosevelt and his administration then secretly adopted policies and manipulated world events to plunge the United States into war against Germany. All of these secret policies and actions occurred while Roosevelt repeatedly told the American public that he was committed to keeping the United States out of war.

Roosevelt Admires Stalin & Hates Hitler

Josef Stalin is widely acknowledged to be one of the world’s most ruthless dictators and one of the greatest mass murderers in all of history. Despite Stalin’s criminal record, Franklin D. Roosevelt was a good friend of Josef Stalin. Roosevelt indulged in provocative name-calling against the heads of totalitarian nations such as Germany, Italy and Japan, but never against Stalin or the Soviet Union.1 Roosevelt always spoke favorably of Stalin, and American wartime propaganda referred to Stalin affectionately as “Uncle Joe.”

Roosevelt’s attitude toward Stalin is remarkable considering that his first appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union warned Roosevelt of the danger of supporting Stalin. William Bullitt served as America’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union from November 1933 to 1936. Bullitt left the Soviet Union with few illusions, and by the end of his tenure he was openly hostile to the Soviet government.

Bullitt stated in his final report from Moscow on April 20, 1936, that the Russian standard of living was possibly lower than that of any other country in the world. Bullitt reported that the Bulgarian Comintern leader, Dimitrov, had admitted that the Soviet popular front and collective security tactics were aimed at undermining the foreign capitalist systems. Bullitt concluded that relations of sincere friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States were impossible.2 Bullitt stated in his final report to the State Department:

The problem of relations with the Government of the Soviet Union is . . . a subordinate part of the problem presented by communism as a militant faith determined to produce world revolution and the “liquidation” (that is to say murder) of all non-believers. There is no doubt whatsoever that all orthodox communist parties in all countries, including the United States, believe in mass murder. . . . The final argument of the believing communist is invariably that all battle, murder, and sudden death, all the spies, exiles, and firing squads are justified.3

Joseph E. Davies succeeded William Bullitt as ambassador to the Soviet Union. Davies reported to President Roosevelt on April 1, 1938, that the terror in Russia was “a horrifying fact.” Davies complained of the gigantic Soviet expenditures for defense, totaling approximately 25% of the Soviet Union’s total income in 1937. Davies reported that Stalin, in a letter to Pravda on Feb. 14, 1938, had confirmed his intention to spread Communism around the world. Stalin also promised in his letter that the Soviet Union would work with foreign Communists to achieve this goal. Stalin concluded in his letter, “I wish very much . . . that there were no longer on earth such unpleasant things as a capitalist environment, the danger of a military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, and so on.” Davies stated in his report that the Soviet Union could best be described as “a terrible tyranny.”4

Roosevelt was fully aware of the slave-labor system, the liquidation of the kulaks, the man-made famine, the extreme poverty and backwardness, and the extensive system of espionage and terror that existed in the Soviet Union. However, from the very beginning of his administration, Roosevelt sang the praises of a regime which recognized no civil liberties whatsoever. In an attempt to gain swift Congressional approval for Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, Roosevelt even stated that Stalin’s regime was at the forefront of “peace and democracy in the world.” At a White House press conference, Roosevelt also claimed that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union.5

Henry A. Wallace, Vice-President of the United States during Roosevelt’s third term, joined the chorus hailing the Soviet Union as a gallant ally whose good faith and good intentions could not be questioned. Vice-President Wallace preached that the Soviet Union could do no wrong, and that any criticism of Stalin’s dictatorship was akin to treason.6 Wallace even stated in a speech that “There are no more similar countries in the world than the Soviet Union and the United States of America.”7

The Roosevelt administration’s support for the Soviet Union was also hailed by former ambassador Joseph Davies in his book Mission to Moscow, which praised Stalin’s tough-minded ability to protect himself from internal threat. Published in 1941, Mission to Moscow provided welcome reassurance to the American public that their democracy was in alliance with a fair-minded and trustworthy Soviet leader. The book became a runaway international success, selling 700,000 copies in the United States alone, and topping the bestseller lists in the 13 languages into which it was translated.8

Among other things, Davies said in his book that the Soviets wanted “to promote the brotherhood of man and to improve the lot of the common people. They wish to create a society in which men live as equals, governed by ethical ideas. They are devoted to peace.”9 Mission to Moscow was turned into a Hollywood movie in 1943 at a time when the American media were celebrating Soviet military triumphs. State Department experts on the Soviet Union called the movie “one of the most blatantly propagandistic pictures ever seen.” Stalin awarded Joseph Davies the Order of Lenin in May 1945 for his contribution to “friendly Soviet-American relations.”10

The Soviet Union had been a totalitarian regime since 1920. By the time Hitler’s National Socialist Party came to power in 1933, the Soviet government had already murdered millions of its own citizens. The Soviet terror campaign accelerated in the late 1930s, resulting in the murder of many more millions of Soviet citizens as well as thousands of American citizens working in the Soviet Union. Many Americans lost their entire families in the Soviet purge of the late 1930s. Despite these well-documented facts, the Roosevelt administration always fully supported the Soviet Union.11

By contrast, the Roosevelt administration’s relationship with Germany steadily deteriorated due to Roosevelt’s acerbic hostility toward Hitler’s regime. Roosevelt and his administration made every effort to convince the American public to support war against Germany even though Hitler had never wanted war with either the United States or Great Britain.

The Secret Polish Documents

The Germans seized a mass of documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs when they invaded Warsaw in late September 1939. The documents were seized when a German SS brigade led by Freiherr von Kuensberg captured the center of Warsaw ahead of the regular German army. Von Kuensberg’s men took control of the Polish Foreign Ministry just as Ministry officials were in the process of burning incriminating documents. These documents clearly establish Roosevelt’s crucial role in planning and instigating World War II. They also reveal the forces behind President Roosevelt that pushed for war.12

Some of the secret Polish documents were first published in the United States as The German White Paper. Probably the most revealing document in the collection is a secret report dated Jan. 12, 1939, by Jerzy Potocki, the Polish ambassador to the United States. This report discusses the domestic situation in the United States. I quote Ambassador Potocki’s report in full:

There is a feeling now prevalent in the United States marked by growing hatred of Fascism, and above all of Chancellor Hitler and everything connected with National Socialism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews who control almost 100% [of the] radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as black as possible—above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited—this propaganda is nevertheless extremely effective since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe.

At the present moment most Americans regard Chancellor Hitler and National Socialism as the greatest evil and greatest peril threatening the world. The situation here provides an excellent platform for public speakers of all kinds, for emigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia who with a great many words and with most various calumnies incite the public. They praise American liberty which they contrast with the totalitarian states.

It is interesting to note that in this extremely well-planned campaign which is conducted above all against National Socialism, Soviet Russia is almost completely eliminated. Soviet Russia, if mentioned at all, is mentioned in a friendly manner and things are presented in such a way that it would seem that the Soviet Union were cooperating with the bloc of democratic states. Thanks to the clever propaganda the sympathies of the American public are completely on the side of Red Spain.

This propaganda, this war psychosis is being artificially created. The American people are told that peace in Europe is hanging only by a thread and that war is inevitable. At the same time the American people are unequivocally told that in case of a world war, America also must take an active part in order to defend the slogans of liberty and democracy in the world. President Roosevelt was the first one to express hatred against Fascism. In doing so he was serving a double purpose; first he wanted to divert the attention of the American people from difficult and intricate domestic problems, especially from the problem of the struggle between capital and labor. Second, by creating a war psychosis and by spreading rumors concerning dangers threatening Europe, he wanted to induce the American people to accept an enormous armament program which far exceeds United States defense requirements.

Regarding the first point, it must be said that the internal situation on the labor market is growing worse constantly. The unemployed today already number 12 million. Federal and state expenditures are increasing daily. Only the huge sums, running into billions, which the treasury expends for emergency labor projects, are keeping a certain amount of peace in the country. Thus far only the usual strikes and local unrest have taken place. But how long this government aid can be kept up it is difficult to predict today. The excitement and indignation of public opinion, and the serious conflict between private enterprises and enormous trusts on the one hand, and with labor on the other, have made many enemies for Roosevelt and are causing him many sleepless nights.

As to point two, I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever player of politics and a connoisseur of American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation in order to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to enhance the war menace overhanging the world on account of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by talking about the attack of the totalitarian states on the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a godsend. He described it as the capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As was said here: Hitler compelled Chamber­lain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace.

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German National Socialism is further kindled by the brutal attitude against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action Jewish intellectuals participated; for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, and others who are personal friends of Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-mongers. These groups, people who want to pose as representatives of “Americanism” and “defenders of democracy” in the last analysis, are connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to put the President of the United States at this “ideal” post of champion of human rights, was a clever move. In this manner they created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a mysterious manner. Roosevelt has been forcing the foundation for vitalizing American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving consciously. With regard to domestic policy, it is extremely convenient to divert public attention from anti-Semitism which is ever growing in the United States, by talking about the necessity of defending faith and individual liberty against the onslaught of Fascism.13

On Jan. 16, 1939, Potocki reported to the Warsaw Foreign Ministry a conversation he had with American Ambassador William Bullitt. Bullitt was in Washington on a brief leave of absence from Paris. Potocki reported that Bullitt stated that the main objectives of the Roosevelt administration were: “1) The vitalizing foreign policy, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries. 2) The United States preparation for war on sea, land and air which will be carried out at an accelerated speed and will consume the colossal sum of 1,250 million dollars. 3) It is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put an end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not let themselves in for any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes. 4) They have the moral assurance that the United States will leave the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal.”14

Juliusz (Jules) Łukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador to France, sent a top secret report from Paris to the Polish Foreign Ministry at the beginning of February 1939. This report outlines the U.S. policy toward Europe as explained to him by William Bullitt:

A week ago, the Ambassador of the United States, W. Bullitt, returned to Paris after having spent three months holiday in America. Meanwhile, I had two conversations with him which enable me to inform Monsieur Minister on his views regarding the European situation and to give a survey of Washington’s policy. . . .

The international situation is regarded by official quarters as extremely serious and being in danger of armed conflict. Competent quarters are of the opinion that if war should break out between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, and Britain and France should be defeated, the Germans would become dangerous to the realistic interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain, naturally after some time had elapsed after the beginning of the war. Ambassador Bullitt expressed this as follows: “Should war break out we shall certainly not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall end it.”15

On March 7, 1939, Ambassador Potocki sent another remarkably perceptive report on Roosevelt’s foreign policy to the Polish government. I quote Potocki’s secret report in full:

The foreign policy of the United States right now concerns not only the government, but the entire American public as well. The most important elements are the public statements of President Roosevelt. In almost every public speech he refers more or less explicitly to the necessity of activating foreign policy against the chaos of views and ideologies in Europe. These statements are picked up by the press and then cleverly filtered into the minds of average Americans in such a way as to strengthen their already formed opinions. The same theme is constantly repeated, namely, the danger of war in Europe and saving the democracies from inundation by enemy fascism. In all of these public statements there is normally only a single theme, that is, the danger from Nazism and Nazi Germany to world peace.

As a result of these speeches, the public is called upon to support rearmament and the spending of enormous sums for the navy and the air force. The unmistakable idea behind this is that in case of an armed conflict the United States cannot stay out but must take an active part in the maneuvers. As a result of the effective speeches of President Roosevelt, which are supported by the press, the American public is today being conscientiously manipulated to hate everything that smacks of totalitarianism and fascism. But it is interesting that the USSR is not included in all of this. The American public considers Russia more in the camp of the democratic states. This was also the case during the Spanish civil war when the so-called Loyalists were regarded as defenders of the democratic idea.

The State Department operates without attracting a great deal of attention, although it is known that Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull and President Roosevelt swear allegiance to the same ideas. However, Hull shows more reserve than Roosevelt, and he loves to make a distinction between Nazism and Chancellor Hitler on the one hand, and the German people on the other. He considers this form of dictatorial government a temporary “necessary evil.” In contrast, the State Department is unbelievably interested in the USSR and its internal situation and openly worries itself over its weaknesses and decline. The main reason for the United States interest in the Russians is the situation in the Far East. The current government would be glad to see the Red Army emerge as victor in a conflict with Japan. That’s why the sympathies of the government are clearly on the side of China, which recently received considerable financial aid amounting to $25 million.

Eager attention is given to all information from the diplomatic posts as well as to the special emissaries of the president who serve as ambassadors of the United States. The president frequently calls his representatives from abroad to Washington for personal exchanges of views and to give them special information and instructions. The arrival of the envoys and ambassadors is always shrouded in secrecy and very little surfaces in the press about the results of their visits. The State Department also takes care to avoid giving out any kind of information about the course of these interviews.

The practical way in which the President makes foreign policy is most effective. He gives personal instructions to his representatives abroad, most of whom are his personal friends. In this way the United States is led down a dangerous path in world politics with the explicit intention of abandoning the comfortable policy of isolation. The President regards the foreign policy of his country as a means of satisfying his own personal ambition. He listens carefully and happily to his echo in the other capitals of the world. In domestic as well as foreign policy, the Congress of the United States is the only object that stands in the way of the President and his government in carrying out his decisions quickly and ambitiously. One hundred and fifty years ago, the Constitution of the United States gave the highest prerogatives to the American parliament which may criticize or reject the law of the White House.

The foreign policy of President Roosevelt has recently been the subject of intense discussion in the lower house and in the Senate, and this has caused excitement. The so-called Isolationists, of whom there are many in both houses, have come out strongly against the President. The representatives and the senators were especially upset over the remarks of the President, which were published in the press, in which he said that the borders of the United States lie on the Rhine. But President Roosevelt is a superb political player and understands completely the power of the American parliament. He has his own people there, and he knows how to withdraw from an uncomfortable situation at the right moment.

Very intelligently and cleverly he ties together the question of foreign policy with the issues of American rearmament. He particularly stresses the necessity of spending enormous sums in order to maintain a defensive peace. He says specifically that the United States is not arming in order to intervene or to go to the aid of England or France in case of war, but because of the need to show strength and military preparedness in case of an armed conflict in Europe. In his view this conflict is becoming ever more acute and is completely unavoidable.

Since the issue is presented this way, the houses of Congress have no cause to object. To the contrary, the houses accepted an armament program of more than 1 billion dollars. (The normal budget is 550 million, the emergency 552 million dollars). However, under the cloak of a rearmament policy, FDR continues to push forward his foreign policy, which unofficially shows the world that in case of war the United States will come out on the side of the democratic states with all military and financial power.

In conclusion it can be said that the technical and moral preparation of the American people for participation in a war—if one should break out in Europe—is proceeding rapidly. It appears that the United States will come to the aid of France and Great Britain with all its resources right from the beginning. However, I know the American public and the representatives and senators who all have the final word, and I am of the opinion that the possibility that America will enter the war as in 1917 is not great. That’s because the majority of the states in the mid-West and West, where the rural element predominates, want to avoid involvement in European disputes at all costs. They remember the declaration of the Versailles Treaty and the well-known phrase that the war was to save the world for democracy. Neither the Versailles Treaty nor that slogan have reconciled the United States to that war. For millions there remains only a bitter aftertaste because of unpaid billions which the European states still owe America.16

These secret Polish reports were written by top level Polish ambassadors who were not necessarily friendly to Germany. However, they understood the realities of European politics far better than people who made foreign policy in the United States. The Polish ambassadors realized that behind all of their rhetoric about democracy and human rights, the Jewish leaders in the United States who agitated for war against Germany were deceptively advancing their own interests.

There is no question that the secret documents taken from the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw are authentic. Charles C. Tansill considered the documents genuine and stated, “Some months ago I had a long conversation with M. Lipsky, the Polish ambassador in Berlin in the prewar years, and he assured me that the documents in the German White Paper are authentic.”17

William H. Chamberlain wrote, “I have been privately informed by an extremely reliable source that Potocki, now residing in South America, confirmed the accuracy of the documents, so far as he was concerned.”18 Historian Harry Elmer Barnes also stated, “Both Professor Tansill and myself have independently established the thorough authenticity of these documents.”19

Edward Raczynski, the Polish ambassador to London from 1934 to 1945, confirmed in his diary the authenticity of the Polish documents. He wrote in his entry on June 20, 1940: “The Germans published in April a White Book containing documents from the archives of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisting of reports from Potocki from Washington, Lukasiewicz in Paris and myself. I do not know where they found them, since we were told that the archives had been destroyed. The documents are certainly genuine, and the facsimiles show that for the most part the Germans got hold of the originals and not merely copies.”20

The official papers and memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz published in 1970 in Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939 reconfirmed the authenticity of the Polish documents. Lukasiewicz was the Polish ambassador to Paris who authored several of the secret Polish documents. The collection was edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, a former Polish diplomat and cabinet member. Jedrzejewicz considered the documents made public by the Germans absolutely genuine, and quoted from several of them.

Tyler G. Kent, who worked at the U.S. Embassy in London in 1939 and 1940, has also confirmed the authenticity of the secret Polish documents. Kent says that he saw copies of U.S. diplomatic messages in the files which corresponded to the Polish documents.21

The German Foreign Office published the Polish documents on March 29, 1940. The Reich Ministry of Propaganda released the documents to strengthen the case of the American isolationists and to prove the degree of America’s responsibility for the outbreak of war. In Berlin, journalists from around the world were permitted to examine the original documents themselves, along with a large number of other documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry. The release of the documents caused an international media sensation. American newspapers published lengthy excerpts from the documents and gave the story large front page headline coverage.22

However, the impact of the released documents was far less than the German government had hoped for. Leading U.S. government officials emphatically denounced the documents as not being authentic. William Bullitt, the U.S. ambassador who was especially incriminated by the documents, stated, “I have never made to anyone the statements attributed to me.” Secretary of State Cordell Hull denounced the documents by stating: “I may say most emphatically that neither I nor any of my associates in the Department of State have ever heard of any such conversations as those alleged, nor do we give them the slightest credence. The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or the policy of the American government.”23 American newspapers stressed these high-level denials in reporting the release of the Polish documents.

These categorical denials by high-level U.S. government officials almost completely eliminated the effect of the secret Polish documents. The vast majority of the American people in 1940 trusted their elected political leaders to tell the truth. If the Polish documents were in fact authentic and genuine, this would mean that President Roosevelt and his representatives had lied to the American public, while the German government told the truth. In 1940, this was far more than the trusting American public could accept.

More Evidence Roosevelt Helped Instigate World War II

While the secret Polish documents alone indicate that Roosevelt was preparing the American public for war against Germany, a large amount of complementary evidence confirms the conspiracy reported by the Polish ambassadors. The diary of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense, also reveals that Roosevelt and his administration helped start World War II. Forrestal’s entry on Dec. 27, 1945, states:

Played golf today with Joe Kennedy [Roosevelt’s Ambassador to Great Britain in the years immediately before the war]. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain’s position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy’s view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt’s urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn’t fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain’s backside. Kennedy’s response always was that putting iron up his backside did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not.

What Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain should have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt’s request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon. Looking backward there is undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy’s belief that Hitler’s attack could have been deflected to Russia.”24

Joseph Kennedy is known to have had a good memory, and it is highly likely that Kennedy’s statements to James Forrestal are accurate. Forrestal died on May 22, 1949, under mysterious circumstances when he fell from his hospital window.

Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to Washington, confirmed Roosevelt’s secret policy to instigate war against Germany with the release of a confidential diplomatic report after the war. The report describes a secret meeting on Sept. 18, 1938, between Roosevelt and Ambassador Lindsay. Roosevelt said that if Britain and France were forced into a war against Germany, the United States would ultimately join the war. Roosevelt’s idea to start a war was for Britain and France to impose a blockade against Germany without actually declaring war. The important point was to call it a defensive war based on lofty humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hostilities with a minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property. The blockade would provoke some kind of German military response, but would free Britain and France from having to declare war. Roosevelt believed he could then convince the American public to support war against Germany, including shipments of weapons to Britain and France, by insisting that the United States was still neutral in a non-declared conflict.25

President Roosevelt told Ambassador Lindsay that if news of their conversation was ever made public, it could mean Roosevelt’s impeachment. What Roosevelt proposed to Lindsay was in effect a scheme to violate the U.S. Constitution by illegally starting a war. For this and other reasons, Ambassador Lindsay stated that during his three years of service in Washington he developed little regard for America’s leaders.26

Ambassador Lindsay in a series of final reports also indicated that Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new world war. Roosevelt promised Lindsay that he would delay German ships under false pretenses in a feigned search for arms. This would allow the German ships to be easily seized by the British under circumstances arranged with exactitude between the American and British authorities. Lindsay reported that Roosevelt “spoke in a tone of almost impish glee and though I may be wrong the whole business gave me the impression of resembling a school-boy prank.”

Ambassador Lindsay was personally perturbed that the President of the United States could be gay and joyful about a pending tragedy which seemed so destructive of the hopes of all mankind. It was unfortunate at this important juncture that the United States had a President whose emotions and ideas were regarded by a friendly British Ambassador as being childish.27

Roosevelt’s desire to support France and England in a war against Germany is discussed in a letter from Verne Marshall, former editor of the Cedar Rapids Gazette, to Charles C. Tansill. The letter states:

President Roosevelt wrote a note to William Bullitt [in the summer of 1939], then Ambassador to France, directing him to advise the French Government that if, in the event of a Nazi attack against Poland, France and England did not go to Poland’s aid, those countries could expect no help from America if a general war developed. On the other hand, if France and England immediately declared war on Germany, they could expect “all aid” from the United States.

FDR’s instructions to Bullitt were to send this word along to “Joe” and “Tony,” meaning Ambassadors Kennedy, in London, and Biddle, in Warsaw, respectively. F.D.R. wanted Daladier, Chamberlain and Josef Beck to know of these instructions to Bullitt. Bullitt merely sent his note from F.D.R. to Kennedy in the diplomatic pouch from Paris. Kennedy followed Bullitt’s idea and forwarded it to Biddle. When the Nazis grabbed Warsaw and Beck disappeared, they must have come into possession of the F.D.R. note. The man who wrote the report I sent you saw it in Berlin in October, 1939.28

William Phillips, the American Ambassador to Italy, also stated in his postwar memoirs that the Roosevelt administration in late 1938 was committed to going to war on the side of Britain and France. Phillips wrote: “On this and many other occasions, I would have liked to have told him [Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister] frankly that in the event of a European war, the United States would undoubtedly be involved on the side of the Allies. But in view of my official position, I could not properly make such a statement without instructions from Washington, and these I never received.”29

When Anthony Eden returned to England in December 1938, he carried with him an assurance from President Roosevelt that the United States would enter as soon as practicable a European war against Hitler if the occasion arose. This information was obtained by Sen. William Borah of Idaho, who was debating how and when to give out this information when he dropped dead in his bathroom. The story was confirmed to historian Harry Elmer Barnes by some of Sen. Borah’s closest colleagues at the time.30

The American Ambassador to Poland, Anthony Drexel Biddle, was an ideological colleague of President Roosevelt and a good friend of William Bullitt. Roosevelt used Biddle to influence the Polish government not to enter into negotiations with Germany. Carl J. Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner to Danzig, reported in his postwar memoirs on a memorable conversation he had with Biddle. On Dec. 2, 1938, Biddle told Burckhardt with remarkable satisfaction that the Poles were ready to wage war over Danzig. Biddle predicted that in April a new crisis would develop, and that moderate British and French leaders would be blown away by public opinion. Biddle predicted a holy war against Germany would break out.31

Bernard Baruch, who was Roosevelt’s chief advisor, scoffed at a statement made on March 10, 1939, by Neville Chamberlain that “the outlook in international affairs is tranquil.” Baruch agreed passionately with Winston Churchill, who had told him: “War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you [the United States] will be in it.”32

Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister in 1939, also confirmed the role of William Bullitt as Roosevelt’s ambassador in pushing France into war. In a letter to Hamilton Fish dated March 26, 1971, Bonnet wrote, “One thing is certain is that Bullitt in 1939 did everything he could to make France enter the war.”33

Dr. Edvard Benes, the former President of Czechoslovakia, wrote in his memoirs that he had a lengthy secret conversation at Hyde Park with President Roosevelt on May 28, 1939. Roosevelt assured Dr. Benes that the United States would actively intervene on the side of Great Britain and France against Germany in the anticipated European war.34

American newspaper columnist Karl von Wiegand, who was the chief European newspaper columnist of the International News Service, met with Ambassador William Bullitt at the U.S. embassy in Paris on April 25, 1939. More than four months before the outbreak of war, Bullitt told Wiegand: “War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland has the assurance of the support of Britain and France, and will yield to no demands from Germany. America will be in the war soon after Britain and France enter it.”35 When Wiegand said that in the end Germany would be driven into the arms of Soviet Russia and Bolshevism, Ambassador Bullitt replied: “What of it. There will not be enough Germans left when the war is over to be worth Bolshevizing.”36

On March 14, 1939, Slovakia dissolved the state of Czechoslovakia by declaring itself an independent republic. Czechoslovakia President Emil Hácha signed a formal agreement the next day with Hitler establishing a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted the Czech portion of the nation. The British government initially accepted the new situation, reasoning that Britain’s guarantee of Czechoslovakia given after Munich was rendered invalid by the internal collapse of the Czech state. It soon became evident after the proclamation of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia that the new regime enjoyed considerable popularity among the Czechs. Also, the danger of a war between the Czechs and the Slovaks had been averted.37

However, Bullitt’s response to the creation of the German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia was highly unfavorable. Bullitt telephoned Roosevelt and, in an “almost hysterical” voice, Bullitt urged Roosevelt to make a dramatic denunciation of Germany and to immediately ask Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act.38

Washington journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported in their nationally syndicated column that on March 16, 1939, President Roosevelt “sent a virtual ultimatum to Chamberlain” demanding that the British government strongly oppose Germany. Pearson and Allen reported that “the President warned that Britain could expect no more support, moral or material through the sale of airplanes, if the Munich policy continued.”39

Responding to Roosevelt’s pressure, the next day Chamberlain ended Britain’s policy of cooperation with Germany when he made a speech at Birmingham bitterly denouncing Hitler. Chamberlain also announced the end of the British “appeasement” policy, stating that from now on Britain would oppose any further territorial moves by Hitler. Two weeks later the British government formally committed itself to war in case of German-Polish hostilities.

Roosevelt also attempted to arm Poland so that Poland would be more willing to go to war against Germany. Ambassador Bullitt reported from Paris in a confidential telegram to Washington on April 9, 1939, his conversation with Polish Ambassador Łukasiewicz. Bullitt told Łukasiewicz that although U.S. law prohibited direct financial aid to Poland, the Roosevelt administration might be able to supply war planes to Poland indirectly through Britain. Bullitt stated: “The Polish Ambassador asked me if it might not be possible for Poland to obtain financial help and airplanes from the United States. I replied that I believed the Johnson Act would forbid any loans from the United States to Poland, but added that it might be possible for England to purchase planes for cash in the United States and turn them over to Poland.”40

Bullitt also attempted to bypass the Neutrality Act and supply France with airplanes. A secret conference of Ambassador Bullitt with French Premier Daladier and the French Minister of Aviation, Guy La Chambre, discussed the procurement of airplanes from America for France. Bullitt, who was in frequent telephonic conversation with Roosevelt, suggested a means by which the Neutrality Act could be circumvented in the event of war. Bullitt’s suggestion was to set up assembly plants in Canada, apparently on the assumption that Canada would not be a formal belligerent in the war. Bullitt also arranged for a secret French mission to come to the United States and purchase airplanes in the winter of 1938-1939. The secret purchase of American airplanes by the French leaked out when a French aviator crashed on the West Coast.41

On Aug. 23, 1939, Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain’s closest advisor, went to American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy with an urgent appeal from Chamberlain to President Roosevelt. Regretting that Britain had unequivocally obligated itself to Poland in case of war, Chamberlain now turned to Roosevelt as a last hope for peace. Kennedy telephoned the State Department and stated: “The British want one thing from us and one thing only, namely that we put pressure on the Poles. They felt that they could not, given their obligations, do anything of this sort but that we could.”

Presented with a possibility to save the peace in Europe, President Roosevelt rejected Chamberlain’s desperate plea out of hand. With Roosevelt’s rejection, Kennedy reported, British Prime Minister Chamberlain lost all hope. Chamberlain stated: “The futility of it all is the thing that is frightful. After all, we cannot save the Poles. We can merely carry on a war of revenge that will mean the destruction of all Europe.”42

Roosevelt Wants the U.S. at War With Germany

After the outbreak of war, Joseph Kennedy contacted Roosevelt and recommended that Roosevelt act boldly for peace. On Sept. 11, 1939, Kennedy cabled to Roosevelt from London: “It seems to me that the situation may crystallize to a point where the President can be the savior of the world. The British government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world. . . .”

President Roosevelt rejected Kennedy’s idea to save peace in Europe. Roosevelt stated to Henry Morgenthau: “Joe has been an appeaser and will always be an appeaser. . . . If Germany and Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow, Joe would start working on the King and his friend the Queen and from there on down to get everybody to accept it.”43

Roosevelt sent Kennedy a strictly confidential telegram on Sept. 11, 1939, stating that any American peace effort was totally out of the question. Roosevelt said that he “sees no opportunity or occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and aggression.”44

President Roosevelt also refused all mediation efforts with the German government. On Oct. 3, 1939, Hermann Goering stated to the American negotiator, William R. Davis: “You can assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish State and a new Czecho-Slovakian independent government would come into being. I agree that the conference should be in Washington.”45 Goering renewed the offer in mid-October 1939, and again at the beginning of 1940. Neither Davis nor the Reich government ever received an answer.

Overtures made by the former president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, were also rejected. The contacts established by the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich, with the Foreign correspondent and Chief of the Berlin office of the Associated Press, L.P. Lochner, were equally unproductive. Roosevelt justified his refusal of mediation by saying, “He could not come to the fore as mediator without the consent of the two Western Powers.”46

The beginning of the war in Europe made it possible for the Roosevelt administration to attempt to eliminate the undesired arms embargo. Roosevelt called a special session of Congress on Sept. 21, 1939, and argued that repeal of the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act was a means to keep the United States at peace. Roosevelt’s exact words were:

Let no group assume the exclusive label of the “peace bloc.” We all belong to it. . . . I give you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today. . . . Our acts must be guided by one single, hardheaded thought—keeping America out of war.47

Many members of Congress disagreed with Roosevelt’s viewpoint. Sen. William E. Borah recalled that Secretary of State Hull had once said that the purpose of the Neutrality Act was to keep us out of war. Borah commented: “If the purpose of the Embargo Act then was to keep us out of war, what is the purpose of repealing it: to get us into war?” Sen. Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., argued that “repeal can only be interpreted at home and abroad as an official act taken by our Government for the purpose of partial participation in the European war.”48

The amended Neutrality Act of 1939 with new cash-and-carry provisions was finally enacted by Congress on Nov. 3, 1939, and signed into law the next day. The amended Neutrality Act enabled Roosevelt to establish a one-sided transfer of weapons to Germany’s adversaries. American vessels were transferred to foreign registries, principally to that of Panama, immediately after this new legislation became law in order not to be restricted by its provisions. It was slick but legal to do so, and although Roosevelt had on other occasions argued against the violation of the “spirit” of laws, he approved of this obvious violation of the purpose of the Neutrality Act. British and French agents began purchasing American vessels as a result of this new legislation.49

Roosevelt also initiated a deceitfully named “neutrality patrol” of American waters by or before Sept. 22, 1939. Wholly contrary to the established rules of international law, the so-called “neutral zone” was extended out to sea anywhere from 300 to 1,000 miles in order to benefit Britain against Germany. It was not long before American naval vessels were directing and escorting British warships to capture German vessels. On Dec. 19, 1939, for example, the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa directed and escorted the British Hyperion to the German merchant vessel Columbus within this “neutral zone.”50

On Oct. 18, 1939, Roosevelt announced that only the submarines of the Soviet Union were allowed in American ports. All the other belligerents were forbidden to enter American ports except in case of force majeure.51

By March 19, 1940, Roosevelt was allowing our advanced type of aircraft to be sold to Britain and other countries, while compelling the American Army and Navy to wait for them for many months to come. This problem became so acute that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox wrote in a report to Roosevelt after the Pearl Harbor attack: “Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.”52

On May 15, 1940, Churchill cabled Roosevelt and requested a long list of war materials, as well as the abandonment of American neutrality. The next day Roosevelt made the first in a series of requests to Congress for additional appropriations “for National Defense.” On May 17, 1940, Roosevelt ordered the remaining older U.S. destroyers to be commissioned. This led to the Sept. 2, 1940, Destroyers for Bases Agreement between the United States and Great Britain. This agreement transferred 50 old destroyers from the United States Navy in exchange for land rights on British possessions.53

On July 19, 1940, Hitler appealed to Great Britain to make peace. Hitler’s offer was very serious, and many competent observers believed that Britain would have accepted Hitler’s offer had it not been for Roosevelt’s intervention.54 Instead, Hitler’s peace offer was rejected, and Churchill continued to make more formidable demands of Roosevelt for help against Germany.

By Dec. 12, 1940, joint staff conferences between the U.S. and Britain were secretly commenced in London, Manila, and Washington. Neither the American people nor the Congress was told the truth about these conferences. Admiral Stark wrote to his fleet commanders at the close of these conferences, “The question of our entry into war now seems to be when, and not whether.”55

Roosevelt began preparing the American public to adopt lend-lease legislation. In a fireside chat to the American public on Dec. 29, 1940, Roosevelt warned of the dire peril supposedly threatening the Western Hemisphere:

Never since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has American civilization been in such danger as now. . . . If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.56

In his State of the Union address to Congress on Jan. 6, 1941, Roosevelt outlined his plan for lend-lease aid to the anti-Axis powers. International law has long recognized that it is an act of war for a neutral government to supply arms, munitions, and implements of war to a belligerent. But Roosevelt brushed off objections to lend-lease based on international law. Roosevelt stated, “Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it to be.” In this same speech, Roosevelt barred the door to suggestions of a negotiated peace, “We are committed to the proposition that the principles of morality and considerations of our own security will not permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers.”57

President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act into law on March 11, 1941. This legislation marked the end of any pretense of neutrality on the part of the United States. Despite soothing assurances by Roosevelt that the United States would not get into the war, the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act was a decisive move which put America into an undeclared war in the Atlantic. It opened up an immediate appeal for naval action to insure that munitions and supplies procured under the Lend-Lease Act would reach Great Britain.58

Roosevelt in the prewar period had two faces. For the American people, the Congress, and the public record, there was the face of bland assurance that Roosevelt would do everything in his power to keep the United States out of war. Typical is a speech Roosevelt made to an audience in Boston: “While I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” Roosevelt added in a later speech, “The first purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war.”59

But in more intimate surroundings Roosevelt presented a second face. Roosevelt talked in private conversations as if the United States was already at war. Dr. Constantin Fotitch, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, stated after a talk with Roosevelt on April 3, 1941: “The United States was still neutral, yet the President spoke to me about the organization of peace after the victory; about ‘common objectives, common efforts and the common enemy;’ in short, as if the United States was already in the war against the Axis. When Mr. Roosevelt received me he greeted me almost as a new ally who had just joined the coalition against the enemy.”60

Another example that Roosevelt had decided to enter the war on the side of Great Britain was revealed by Harry Hopkins at a luncheon on Jan. 11, 1941. Hopkins told Winston Churchill: “The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him—there is nothing he will not do so far as he has human power.”61

On April 9, 1941, the United States entered into an agreement with a Danish official for the defense of Greenland. Simultaneously, Roosevelt illegally sent American Marines to occupy Greenland.62 In June 1941, Roosevelt also agreed with Churchill to relieve the British troops in Iceland, and this was done with U.S. Marines on July 7, 1941.63 Also in June 1941, Roosevelt ordered the closing of all the German and Italian consulates in the United States.64

Another step toward war in the Atlantic was the adoption on April 24, 1941, by the United States of a naval patrol system to insure delivery of munitions and supplies to Great Britain. The American Navy under this scheme was assigned the responsibility of patrolling the Atlantic Ocean west of a median point represented by 25º longitude. American warships and planes within this area would search out German vessels and submarines and broadcast their position to the British Navy. Roosevelt tried to represent the naval patrol as a merely defensive move, but it was clearly a hostile act toward Germany designed to help the British war effort.65

Late June and July 1941 were largely concerned with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The first wartime meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill began on Aug. 9, 1941, in a conference at the harbor of Argentia in Newfoundland. The principal result of this conference was the signing of the Atlantic Charter on Aug. 14, 1941. Roosevelt repeated to Churchill during this conference his predilection for an undeclared war, saying, “I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months.”

The Atlantic Charter was in effect a joint declaration of war aims, although Congress had not voted for American participation in the war. The Atlantic Charter, which provided for Anglo-American cooperation in policing the world after the Second World War, was a tacit but inescapable implication that the United States would soon become involved in the war. This implication is fortified by the large number of top military and naval staff personnel who were present at the conference.66

Roosevelt’s next move toward war in the Atlantic was the issuing of secret orders on Aug. 25, 1941, to the Atlantic Fleet to attack and destroy German and Italian “hostile forces.”  These secret orders resulted in an incident on Sept. 4, 1941, between an American destroyer, the Greer, and a German submarine.67 Roosevelt falsely claimed in a fireside chat to the American public on Sept. 11, 1941, that the German submarine had fired first. The reality is that the Greer had tracked the German submarine for three hours, and broadcast the submarine’s location for the benefit of any British airplanes and destroyers which might be in the vicinity. The German submarine fired at the Greer only after a British airplane had dropped four depth charges which missed their mark. During this fireside chat Roosevelt finally admitted that, without consulting Congress or obtaining congressional sanction, he had ordered a shoot-on-sight campaign against Axis submarines.68

On Sept. 13, 1941, Roosevelt ordered the Atlantic Fleet to escort convoys in which there were no American vessels.69 This policy would make it more likely to provoke future incidents between American and German vessels. Roosevelt also agreed about this time to furnish Britain with “our best transport ships.” These included 12 liners and 20 cargo vessels manned by American crews to transport two British divisions to the Middle East.70

More serious incidents followed in the Atlantic. On Oct. 17, 1941, an American destroyer, the Kearny, dropped depth charges on a German submarine. The German submarine retaliated and hit the Kearny with a torpedo, resulting in the loss of 11 lives. On Oct. 30, 1941, an older American destroyer, the Reuben James, was sunk with a casualty list of 115 of her crew members.71 Some of her seamen were convinced the Reuben James had already sunk a U-boat or two before she was torpedoed by the German submarine.72

On Oct. 27, 1941, Roosevelt broadcast over nationwide radio his Navy Day address. Roosevelt began his Navy Day address by stating that German submarines had torpedoed the U.S. destroyers Greer and Kearny. Roosevelt characterized these incidents as unprovoked acts of aggression directed against all Americans, and that “history will record who fired the first shot.”

What Roosevelt failed to mention in his broadcast is that in each case the U.S. destroyers had been involved in attack operations against the German submarines, which fired in self-defense only as a last resort. Hitler wanted to avoid war with the United States at all costs, and had expressly ordered German submarines to avoid conflicts with U.S. warships, except to avoid imminent destruction. It was Roosevelt’s shoot-on-sight orders to U.S. Navy vessels that were designed to make incidents like the ones Roosevelt condemned inevitable.73

In an effort to convince his listeners in his Navy Day speech that Germany was a real threat to American security, Roosevelt made the following announcement: “Hitler has often protested that his plans for conquest do not extend across the Atlantic Ocean. I have in my possession a secret map, made in Germany by Hitler’s government—by the planners of the new world order. It is a map of South America and a part of Central America as Hitler proposes to organize it.” Roosevelt explained that the map showed South America, as well as “our great life line, the Panama Canal,” divided into five vassal states under German control. Roosevelt concluded: “That map, my friends, makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America but against the United States as well.”74

The Italian government stated that if Roosevelt did not publish his map “within 24 hours, he will acquire a sky high reputation as a forger.” A reporter at a press conference the next day asked Roosevelt for a copy of the secret map. Roosevelt refused, insisting that it came from “a source which is undoubtedly reliable.” The truth about the map emerged after the war: It was a forgery produced by the British intelligence service. William Stephenson, chief of British intelligence operations in North America, passed it on to the chief of U.S. intelligence, William Donovan, who gave it to Roosevelt. Wartime British agent Ivar Bryce claimed credit for thinking up the secret map in his memoir published in late 1984.75

Roosevelt went on in his Navy Day address to mention that he also had in his possession “another document made in Germany by Hitler’s government. It is a detailed plan to abolish all existing religions—Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jewish alike” which Germany will impose “on a dominated world, if Hitler wins.”

Roosevelt continued: “The property of all churches will be seized by the Reich and its puppets. The cross and all other symbols of religion are to be forbidden. The clergy are to be ever liquidated. . . . In the place of the churches of our civilization there is to be set up an international Nazi church, a church which will be served by orators sent out by the Nazi government. And in the place of the Bible, the words of Mein Kampf will be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ. And in the place of the cross of Christ will be put two symbols: the swastika and the naked sword.”76

As with the secret map, the German government correctly denounced Roosevelt’s religious document as a preposterous fraud. Roosevelt’s Navy Day address was loaded with brazen falsehoods designed to convince the American public to enter into war against Germany. Despite Roosevelt’s lies and provocations, the American public was still against entering the war. By the end of October 1941, Roosevelt had no more ideas how to get into a formal and declared war: “. . . He had said everything ‘short of war’ that could be said. He had no more tricks left. The hat from which he had pulled so many rabbits was empty.”77

Even full-page advertisements entitled “Stop Hitler Now” inserted in major American newspapers by Roosevelt’s supporters had failed to sway the American public. The advertisements warned the American people that a Europe dominated by Hitler was a threat to American democracy and the Western Hemisphere. The advertisements asked: “Will the Nazis considerately wait until we are ready to fight them? Anyone who argues that they will wait is either an imbecile or a traitor.” Roosevelt endorsed the advertisement, saying that it was “a great piece of work.”78

Yet the American people were still strongly against war.

Germany and Italy had firmly decided to do nothing that would accelerate or cause America’s entry into the war. The front door to war in Europe appeared to be completely barred. Roosevelt was forced to use the back door to obtain a declared war against Germany.

Roosevelt Uses Japan as a Back Door to War

The impetus for the war which began at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, had started 10 years earlier. In September 1931, Japan seized Mukden, the capital of the semi-independent Chinese regime in Manchuria. The seizure of Mukden was the beginning of a process that eventually led to all of Manchuria being under Japanese control. A new state, Manchukuo, was set up under the nominal rule of an emperor, but whose real power was in the hands of Japanese army officers and civilian officials. The United States refused to recognize Manchukuo, but this led to no major adverse consequences.79

A new crisis arose when Japan and China began a large-scale war in the summer of 1937. In an address in Chicago on Oct. 5, 1937, Roosevelt proposed that aggressor nations be subject to “quarantine.”80 This was Roosevelt’s first public attempt to discard the doctrine of neutrality for the United States in concert with what later became known as “peace-loving nations”—among them the Soviet Union. However, Roosevelt could not get the American people to support the “quarantine” proposal because the American public did not want their elected officials to thrust war upon them.81 There is no doubt that Roosevelt was disappointed by the failure of the American people to respond favorably to his speech.82

The most serious incident affecting America’s relations with Japan before Pearl Harbor was the sinking of the United States gunboat Panay by Japanese bombers on Dec. 12, 1937. Four lives were lost in the bombing. The sinking of the Panay closely followed the capture of the Chinese capital of Nanking, and the Japanese military leaders had been in an exuberant, trigger-happy mood. The Japanese government was quick to apologize for the incident, and paid an indemnity of two and a quarter million dollars to compensate the United States for its losses. Fortunately, the sinking of the Panay failed to kindle any desire for war in the United States.83

The United States began a campaign of economic pressure against Japan. On July 26, 1939, the United States gave notice to Japan of its intention, effective six months from the date, to abrogate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. On July 2, 1940, Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials. Roosevelt acted at once under these powers.84 U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, remarked, “I have pointed out that once started on a policy of sanctions we must see them through and that such a policy may conceivably lead to eventual war.”85

On July 26, 1940, Roosevelt announced a ban on Japanese acquisition of U.S. high-octane aviation gasoline, certain grades of steel and scrap iron, and some lubricants. On Sept. 26, 1940, Roosevelt imposed a ban on all scrap iron exports to Japan. Since the Japanese steel industry was highly dependent on imported scrap iron from the United States, the ban compelled Japan to draw down its stockpiles and operate its steel industry well below capacity. The embargo was expanded in December 1940 to include iron ore, steel, and steel products. The following month the embargo was expanded to include copper, brass, bronze, zinc, nickel, and potash. Other items were continually added to the list, each of which was much needed for Japanese industrial production.86

Provoking Japan into an overt act of war was the principal policy that guided Roosevelt’s actions toward Japan throughout 1941. Lt. Cmdr. Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote an eight-action memo dated Oct. 7, 1940, outlining how to provoke a Japanese attack on the United States. McCollum had spent his youth in various Japanese cities and spoke Japanese before learning English. McCollum was an expert in Japanese activities, culture, and intentions, and he had access to intercepted and decoded Japanese military and diplomatic messages. The following are the eight actions that McCollum predicted would provoke a Japanese attack on the United States:

  • Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
  • Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
  • Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
  • Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
  •  Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
  •  Keep the main strength of the U.S. Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
  •  Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
  • Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.87

McCollum’s eight-action memorandum was approved by Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisers. Roosevelt’s “fingerprints” can be found on each of the provocations listed in the memorandum. For example, Roosevelt personally took charge of the fourth action, which involved the deliberate deployment of American warships within or adjacent to the territorial waters of Japan. Roosevelt called the provocations under the fourth action “pop-up” cruises. Roosevelt stated: “I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six.” White House records show that from March through July 1941, Roosevelt ignored international law and dispatched naval vessels into Japanese waters on three such pop-up cruises.88

Roosevelt also adopted additional measures that were consistent with the third action listed in McCollum’s eight-action memorandum of giving aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek. The United States had loaned China 25 million dollars for currency stabilization on Sept. 25, 1940. China received an additional 100 million dollar loan on Nov. 30, 1940. On March 11, 1941, China became eligible for lend-lease aid. The United States also entered into a monetary stabilization accord with China on April 26, 1941.89 Finally, increased military aid was granted to Chiang Kai-shek, and a U.S. Army Commission was sent to China in October 1941.90

The climax of Roosevelt’s measures designed to bring about war in the Pacific occurred on July 25, 1941, when Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States. This brought commercial relations between the nations to an effective end, including an end to the export of oil to Japan. As early as Aug. 7, 1941, Prince Konoye, the Japanese premier, requested a meeting with Roosevelt to resolve the differences between the United States and Japan. American Ambassador Grew sent a series of telegrams to Washington, D.C. in which he strongly recommended that such a meeting take place. However, Roosevelt steadfastly refused to meet with the Japanese premier.91

Foreign Minister Toyoda made a dispatch to Japanese Ambassador Nomura on July 31, 1941. Since U.S. Intelligence had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code, Roosevelt and his associates were able to read this message:

Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. . . . I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied with our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident.92

This obvious desire of Japan for peace with the United States did not change Roosevelt’s policy toward Japan. Roosevelt refused to lift the oil embargo against Japan. The Roosevelt administration was well aware that Japan imported approximately 90% of her oil, and that 75% to 80% of her oil imports came from the United States. Roosevelt also knew that the Netherlands East Indies, which produced 3% of the world’s oil output, was the only other convenient oil producer that could meet Japan’s import needs.93

On Oct. 31, 1941, an oil agreement between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies expired. The Netherlands East Indies had promised to deliver to Japan about 11.4 million barrels of oil, but had actually delivered only one-half of that amount. The Japanese Navy had consumed about 22% of its oil reserves by the time the war broke out.94

Resentment over the economic pressure being exerted by the United States and other countries began mounting in Japan. U.S. Ambassador Grew repeatedly warned Roosevelt and his administration that economic pressure would not bring Japan to its knees. Ambassador Grew cautioned that a belligerent Japanese response “may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.”95 Ambassador Grew’s warnings, as he later remarked in his diary, “brought no response whatsoever; they were never even referred to, and reporting to the Department was like throwing pebbles into a lake at night; we were never even permitted to see the ripples.”96

The refusal of Roosevelt to meet with Konoye and Roosevelt’s economic boycott of Japan were a real ultimatum to Japan. On Nov. 5, 1941, Japan sent instructions to Ambassador Nomura that Nov. 25, 1941, would be the deadline in the negotiations with the United States. Tensions between Japan and the United States continued to mount, but Roosevelt and his administration showed no interest in negotiations with Japan. Ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Defense Secretary Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: “[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”97

Roosevelt and his advisors briefly discussed a modus vivendi or truce with Japan. In fact, on Nov. 21, 1941, the army’s War Plans Division told Secretary of State Cordell Hull it was a matter of “grave importance . . . that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.”98 Hull permitted the peacemakers in Roosevelt’s administration to put together a proposal that had real potential. The proposal offered Japan practical proof of American friendship in the form of a 2-billion-dollar loan contingent on Japan’s ending the war with China on reasonable terms. The proposal promised a renewal of the shipments of oil, metals, and other minerals that Japan needed for her factories. The proposal might have at least produced a temporary truce with Japan. But the idea of a modus vivendi was quickly rejected by interventionists in the State Department and War Department, and the final version was an unacceptable ghost of the original proposal.99

Instead of a modus vivendi, on Nov. 26, 1941, Secretary of State Hull handed to the Japanese diplomatic representatives a 10-point proposal which amounted to a sharp ultimatum. The proposal, which was cleared by Roosevelt before submission, called for complete Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina. The proposal also called for Japan to support only the Nationalist government of China, with which Japan had been in conflict for four years, and to interpret its pledges under the Tripartite Pact so that Japan would be bound to peace in the Pacific and to noninterference in Europe. The United States would meanwhile be free to intervene in Europe.100

Roosevelt knew that the Japanese government could not accept such a proposal: the proposal was in effect an invitation to war. The Japanese leaders were dumbfounded by such harsh terms, referring to the proposal as “humiliating.”101 In a defense deposition at the Tokyo war crime trials, Foreign Minister Togo said of the Hull proposal: “The reaction of all of us to it was, I think, the same. Ignoring all past progress and areas of agreement in the negotiations, the United States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum containing demands far in excess of the strongest positions theretofore taken.”102

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, as a result of Roosevelt’s provocations. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was relieved the attack had taken place. Stimson stated:

We three [Hull, Knox, Stimson] all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii. . . . When the news first came in that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.103

Roosevelt and his administration had finally forced Japan to attack the United States. The American public would now enthusiastically supported all-out war with Japan. The next step was to provoke Hitler and Germany into declaring war on the United States.

Germany Declares War on the United States

On Dec. 8, 1941, President Roosevelt made a speech to Congress calling for a declaration of war against Japan. Condemning the attack on Pearl Harbor as a “date which will live in infamy,” Roosevelt did not once mention Germany. Hitler’s policy of keeping incidents between the United States and Germany to a minimum seemed to have succeeded. Hitler had ignored or downplayed the numerous provocations that Roosevelt had made against Germany. Even after Roosevelt issued orders on Oct. 8, 1941, to shoot-on-sight at German submarines, Hitler had ordered his naval commanders and air force to avoid incidents that Roosevelt might use to bring America into the war. Also, since the Tripartite Pact did not obligate Germany to join Japan in a war initiated by Japan, it appeared unlikely that Hitler would declare war on the U.S.104

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor surprised Hitler. Hitler had never wanted Japan to attack the United States. Germany had repeatedly urged Japan to attack Singapore and the rest of Great Britain’s Far East Empire, but Japan refused to do so. After the war Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl said that Hitler had wanted Japan to attack Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the Far East, which would have set up a two-front war. Hitler thought Roosevelt would probably not be able to persuade the American public to go to war to defend Britain’s Asian colonies. Jodl said that Hitler had wanted in Japan “a strong new ally without a strong new enemy.”105

Hitler’s decision to stay out of war with the United States was made more difficult on Dec. 4, 1941, when the Chicago Tribune carried in huge black letters the headline: F.D.R.’s WAR PLANS! The Washington Times Herald, the largest paper in the nation’s capital, carried a similar headline. Chesly Manly, the Tribune’s Washington correspondent, revealed in his report what Roosevelt had repeatedly denied: that Roosevelt was planning to lead the United States into war against Germany. The source of Manly’s information was no less than a verbatim copy of Rainbow Five, the top-secret war plan drawn up at Roosevelt’s request by the joint board of the United States Army and Navy. Manly’s story even contained a copy of President Roosevelt’s letter ordering the preparation of the plan.106

Rainbow Five called for the creation of a 10-million-man army, including an expeditionary force of 5 million men that would invade Europe in 1943 to defeat Germany. On Dec. 5, 1941, the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., cabled the entire transcript of the newspaper story to Berlin. The story was reviewed and analyzed in Berlin as “the Roosevelt War Plan.” On Dec. 6, 1941, Adm. Erich Raeder submitted a report to Hitler prepared by his staff that analyzed the Rainbow Five plan.

Raeder concluded that the most important point contained in Rainbow Five was the fact that the United States would not be ready to launch a military offensive against Germany until July 1943.107

On Dec. 9, 1941, Hitler returned to Berlin from the Russian front and plunged into two days of conferences with Raeder, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering. The three advisors stressed that the Rainbow Five plan showed that the United States was determined to defeat Germany. They pointed out that Rainbow Five stated that the United States would undertake to carry on the war against Germany alone even if Russia collapsed and Britain surrendered to Germany. The three advisors leaned toward Adm. Raeder’s view that an air and U-boat offensive against both British and American ships might be risky, but that the United States was already unquestionably an enemy.108

On Dec. 9, 1941, Roosevelt made a radio address to the nation that is seldom mentioned in the history books. In addition to numerous uncomplimentary remarks about Hitler and Nazism, Roosevelt accused Hitler of urging Japan to attack the United States. Roosevelt declared:

We know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations with a joint plan. Germany and Italy consider themselves at war with the United States without even bothering about a formal declaration. . . . Your government knows Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan would attack the United States  Japan would share the spoils when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive control of the whole Pacific area and that means not only the Far East, but all the islands of the Pacific and also a stranglehold on the west coast of North and Central and South America. We know also that Germany and Japan are conducting their naval operations in accordance with a joint plan.109

All of the above statements are obviously false. Germany and Japan did not have a joint naval plan before Pearl Harbor, and never concocted one for the rest of the war. Germany did not have foreknowledge and certainly never encouraged Japan to attack the United States. Japan never had any ambition to attack the west coast of North, Central, or South America. Germany also never promised anything to Japan in the Far East. Germany’s power in the Far East was negligible.110

On Dec. 10, 1941, when Hitler resumed his conference with Raeder, Keitel, and Goering, Hitler said that Roosevelt’s speech confirmed everything in the Tribune story. Hitler considered Roosevelt’s speech to be a de facto declaration of war. Since war with the United States was inevitable, Hitler felt he had no choice but to declare war on the United States. Hitler declared war on the U.S. in his Reichstag speech on Dec. 11, 1941, stating among other things:

Since the beginning of the war, the American President Roosevelt has steadily committed ever more serious crimes against international law. Along with illegal attacks against ships and other property of German and Italian citizens, there have been threats and even arbitrary deprivations of personal freedom by internment and such. The increasingly hostile attacks by the American President Roosevelt have reached the point that he has ordered the American navy to immediately attack, fire upon and sink all German and Italian ships, in complete violation of international law. American officials have even boasted about destroying German submarines in this criminal manner. American cruisers have attacked and captured German and Italian merchant ships, and their peaceful crews were taken away to imprisonment. In addition, President Roosevelt’s plan to attack Germany and Italy with military forces in Europe by 1943 at the latest was made public in the United States, and the American government made no effort to deny it.

Despite the years of intolerable provocations by President Roosevelt, Germany and Italy sincerely and very patiently tried to prevent the expansion of this war and to maintain relations with the United States. But as a result of his campaign, these efforts have failed.111

Hitler ended this speech with a declaration of war against the United States. Roosevelt had finally gotten a declared war with Germany using Japan as a back door to war.

Closing Thoughts

No nation has ever been led into war with as many soothing promises of peace as the American public received from President Roosevelt. Most of the American public felt that the United States had entered the First World War under false pretenses. Polls consistently showed that the American people did not favor entry into a second war in Europe. Roosevelt assuaged these fears with statements such as “. . . I have passed unnumbered hours, I shall pass unnumbered hours, thinking and planning how war may be kept from this nation.”112

The truth is that Roosevelt did everything in his power to plunge the United States into war against Germany. Roosevelt eventually went so far as to order American vessels to shoot-on-sight German and Italian vessels—a flagrant act of war. However, Hitler wanted to avoid war with the United States at all costs. Hitler expressly ordered German submarines to avoid conflicts with U.S. warships, except to prevent imminent destruction. It appeared that Hitler’s efforts might be successful in keeping the United States out of the war against Germany.

President Roosevelt finally was able to use Japan as a back door to instigate war against Germany. Roosevelt followed an eight-step action plan designed to induce Japan to attack the United States. The complete embargo of all trade with Japan was especially crippling to Japan, as she was dependent on imports of oil and other natural resources for her existence. When the United States refused to negotiate with Japan to ease the embargo, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and other places in the Far East. Germany declared war against the United States four days after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. The leak of Rainbow Five, which outlined the plan of the United States to invade Germany by July 1943, had forced Germany to declare war on the United States.

Defenders of Roosevelt’s policies claim that National Socialist Germany was so uniquely evil that she had to be stopped at all costs. Germany had already taken over most of Europe, and many people believed that the United States must enter the war to protect democracy and freedom around the world. In the next chapter we will examine how the war in Europe started. We will also examine whether the United States needed to enter the war to stop Germany’s aggression in Europe and Asia.


1 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, pp. 8, 16.

2 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 423.

3 Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 73.

4 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 423.

5 Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 204.

6 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp.  242-244.

7 Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 224.

8 Ibid., p. 147.

9 Davies, Joseph E., Mission to Moscow, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941, p. 511.

10 Dobbs, Michael, Six Months in 1945, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012, p. 215.

11 Tzouliadis, Tim, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, pp. 100-102, 105, 127.

12 “President Roosevelt’s Campaign to Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1983, pp. 136-137, 140.

13 Count Jerzy Potocki to Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, The German White Paper: Full Text of the Polish Documents Issued by the Berlin Foreign Office; with a forward by C. Hartley Grattan, New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, 1940, pp. 29-31.

14 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

15 Juliusz Lukasiewicz to Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, The German White Paper: Full Text of the Polish Documents Issued by the Berlin Foreign Office; with a forward by C. Hartley Grattan, New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, 1940, pp. 43-44.

16 Germany. Foreign Office Archive Commission. Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg: Geheimdokumente zur Kriegspolitik des Praesidenten der Vereinigten Staaten. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1943. Translated into English by the IHR, “President Roosevelt’s Campaign to Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents,” The Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1983, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 150-152.

17 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 184 (footnote 292).

18 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 60 (footnote 14).

19 Barnes, Harry Elmer, The Court Historians versus Revisionism, N.p.: privately printed, 1952, p. 10.

20 Raczynski, Edward, In Allied London, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963, p. 51.

21 “President Roosevelt’s Campaign to Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents,” The Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1983, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 142.

22 Ibid., pp. 137-139.

23 New York Times, March 30, 1940, p. 1.

24 Forrestal, James V., The Forrestal Diaries, edited by Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield, New York: Vanguard Press, 1951, pp. 121-122.

25 Dispatch No. 349 of Sept. 30, 1938, by Sir Ronald Lindsay, Documents on British Foreign Policy, (ed.). Ernest L. Woodard, Third Series, Vol. VII, London, 1954, pp. 627-629. See also Lash, Joseph P., Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941, New York: Norton, 1976, pp. 25-27.

26 Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 31, 164-165.

27 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 518-519.

28 Tansill, Charles C., “The United States and the Road to War in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 168.

29 Phillips, William, Ventures in Diplomacy, North Beverly, MA: privately published, 1952, pp. 220-221.

30 Barnes, Harry Elmer, Barnes Against the Blackout, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1991, p. 208.

31 Burckhardt, Carl, Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939, Munich: Callwey, 1960, p. 225.

32 Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948, p. 113.

33 Fish, Hamilton, FDR The Other Side of the Coin: How We Were Tricked into World War II, New York: Vantage Press, 1976, p. 62.

34 Benes, Edvard, Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954, pp. 79-80.

35 “Von Wiegand Says-,” Chicago-Herald American, Oct. 8, 1944, p. 2.

36 Chicago-Herald American, April 23, 1944, p. 18.

37 Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 250.

38 Moffat, Jay P., The Moffat Papers 1919-1943, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 232.

39 Pearson, Drew and Allen, Robert S., “Washington Daily Merry-Go-Round,” Washington Times-Herald, April 14, 1939, p. 16.

40 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Diplomatic Papers), 1939, General, Vol. I, Washington: 1956, p. 122.

41 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 101-102.

42 Koskoff, David E., Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 207; see also Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005, p. 272.

43 Beschloss, Michael R., Kennedy and Roosevelt, New York: Norton, 1980, pp. 190-191.

44 Hull to Kennedy (No. 905), U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, General, Vol. I, Washington: 1956, p. 424.

45 Tansill, Charles, Back Door to War—The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941, Chicago: Regnery, 1952, pp. 560-561.

46 Walendy, Udo, Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War, Washington, D.C.: The Barnes Review, 2013, pp. 365-366.

47 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 103.

48 Ibid., pp. 103-104.

49 Sanborn, Frederic R., Design For War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, pp. 96-97.

50 Ibid., p. 90.

51 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt; edited by Samuel I. Rosenman, 13 Vols., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941, VIII, pp. 552-554.

52 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part XXIV, p. 1753.

53 Sanborn, Frederic R., “Roosevelt is Frustrated in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 210-211.

54 Ibid., p. 212.

55 Ibid., pp. 213-214.

56 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 128.

57 Ibid., pp. 129-130.

58 Ibid., p. 130.

59 Ibid., pp. 124-125.

60 Fotitch, Constantin, The War We Lost: Yugoslavia’s Tragedy and the Failure of the West, New York: Viking Press, 1948, p. 86.

61 Barnes, Harry Elmer, “Summary and Conclusions,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 678-679. See also Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War Within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. 83-84, and Churchill, Winston S., The Grand Alliance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 23.

62 Sanborn, Frederic R., Design For War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, p. 258.

63 Churchill, Winston S., The Grand Alliance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, pp. 149-150.

64 Sanborn, Frederic R., “Roosevelt is Frustrated in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 216.

65 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 136-137.

66 Sanborn, Frederic R., “Roosevelt is Frustrated in Europe,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 217-218.

67 Ibid., p. 218.

68 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 147-148.

69 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part V, p. 2295.

70 Churchill, Winston S., The Grand Alliance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, pp. 492-493.

71 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 148-149.

72 Newsweek, Nov. 10, 1941, p. 35.

73 “Roosevelt’s ‘Secret Map’ Speech,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 125-126.

74 Ibid., p. 126.

75 Ibid., pp. 126-127.

76 Ibid., p. 126.

77 Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948, p. 438; see also Churchill, Winston S., The Grand Alliance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 539.

78 Johnson, Walter, The Battle against Isolation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. 85-87.

79 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 153-154.

80 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt; edited by Samuel I. Rosenman, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941, VI, p. 408.

81 Morgenstern, George, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 318.

82 Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 6.

83 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 156.

84 Morgenstern, George, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, p. 322.

85 Grew, Joseph C., Ten Years In Japan, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944, p. 281.

86 Miller, Edward S., Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007, pp. 88-123.

87 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, pp. 6, 8.

88 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

89 Chamberlain, William Henry, America’s Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, p. 158.

90 Stinnett, Robert B., Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, New York: The Free Press, 2000, p. 156.

91 Morgenstern, George, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 327-331.

92 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part XII, p. 9.

93 Miller, Edward S., Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007, p. 162.

94 Sanborn, Frederic R., Design for War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, p. 424.

95 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, Department of State Publication 2016, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943, II, pp. 701-704.

96 Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 298.

97 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part XI, p. 5433.

98 Heinrichs, Waldo, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II, New York: 1988, p. 213

99 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 21.

100 Morgenstern, George, “The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor,” in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 344-346.

101 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part XII, p. 195.

102 Record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1946, Exhibit No. 3646.

103 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess., 39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, Part XI, p. 5438.

104 Meskill, Johanna Menzel, Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance, New York: 1955, p. 40.

105 Fleming, Thomas, The New Dealers’ War: FDR and the War within World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. 31-32.

106 Ibid., p. 1.

107 Ibid., pp. 1-2, 33.

108 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

109 Ibid., pp. 34-35.

110 Meskill, Johanna Menzel, Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance, New York: 1955, pp. 1-47.

111 “The Reichstag Speech of 11 December 1941: Hitler’s Declaration of War Against the United States,” The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1988-1989, p. 412.

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